Equal representation in two-tier voting systems

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 401-420

  Maaser, Nicola ^a   Napel, Stefan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847354727     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0186-z     Document Type: Article

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