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Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 185-205

Success versus decisiveness: Conceptual discussion and case study

Author keywords

Decisiveness; European Union; Power; Success; Voting

Indexed keywords


EID: 33645022101     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629806061866     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (27)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.