Bargaining in legislatures

American Political Science Review

Volumn 83, Issue 4, 1989, Pages 1181-1206

  Baron, David P ^a   Ferejohn, John A ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84973994613     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1961664     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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