Wars of attrition in Italian government coalitions and fiscal performance: 1948-1994

Public Choice

Volumn 109, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 15-54

  Padovano, Fabio ^a   Venturi, Larissa ^a  

^a ROMA TRE UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035604065     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1012014128810     Document Type: Review

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