On the packing of selfish items

20th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, IPDPS 2006

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages

  Bilò, Vittorio ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALENTO   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF L'AQUILA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; BANDWIDTH; COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK; CONVERGENCE OF NUMERICAL METHODS; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; GAME THEORY;

BANDWIDTH COST SHARING; MINIMUM BIN PACKING PROBLEM; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 33847165006     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/IPDPS.2006.1639283     Document Type: Conference Paper

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