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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 247-262
Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games
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EID: 0042761768     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0810     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (33)
References (15)
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    • Banks, J.1    Calvert, R.2
  • 2
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    • Reputation in Repeated Second-Price Auctions
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    • Bikchandani, S.1
  • 3
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    • Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
    • Crawford V., Haller H. Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games. Econometrica. 58:1990;571-595.
    • (1990) Econometrica , vol.58 , pp. 571-595
    • Crawford, V.1    Haller, H.2
  • 4
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    • Entry Dynamics with Mixed Strategies
    • L. G. Thomas. Lexington: Lexington Books
    • Dixit A., Shapiro C. Entry Dynamics with Mixed Strategies. Thomas L. G. The Economics of Strategic Planning. 1985;Lexington Books, Lexington.
    • (1985) The Economics of Strategic Planning
    • Dixit, A.1    Shapiro, C.2
  • 5
    • 0002735252 scopus 로고
    • Cheap Talk, Coordination and Entry
    • Farrell J. Cheap Talk, Coordination and Entry. Rand J. Econ. 18:1987;34-39.
    • (1987) Rand J. Econ. , vol.18 , pp. 34-39
    • Farrell, J.1
  • 6
    • 0001840079 scopus 로고
    • Coordination through Committees and Markets
    • Farrell J., Saloner G. Coordination through Committees and Markets. Rand J. Econ. 19:1988;235-252.
    • (1988) Rand J. Econ. , vol.19 , pp. 235-252
    • Farrell, J.1    Saloner, G.2
  • 7
    • 0000919418 scopus 로고
    • On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games
    • Fudenberg D., Maskin E. On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games. J. Econ. Theory. 53:1991;428-438.
    • (1991) J. Econ. Theory , vol.53 , pp. 428-438
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 8
    • 0030372667 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Can We Rationally Learn to Coordinate?
    • Goyal S., Janssen M. Can We Rationally Learn to Coordinate? Theory Decision. 40:1996;29-49.
    • (1996) Theory Decision , vol.40 , pp. 29-49
    • Goyal, S.1    Janssen, M.2
  • 10
    • 85020616309 scopus 로고
    • Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility
    • Katz M., Shapiro C. Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility. Amer. Econ. Rev. 75:1985;424-440.
    • (1985) Amer. Econ. Rev. , vol.75 , pp. 424-440
    • Katz, M.1    Shapiro, C.2
  • 11
    • 0001416324 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Auctions with Almost Common Values: The 'Wallet Game' and Its Applications
    • Klemperer P. Auctions with Almost Common Values: The 'Wallet Game' and Its Applications. Europ. Econ. Rev. 42:1998;757-769.
    • (1998) Europ. Econ. Rev. , vol.42 , pp. 757-769
    • Klemperer, P.1
  • 12
    • 0030365831 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Dynamic Focal Points in N-Person Coordination Games
    • Kramarz F. Dynamic Focal Points in N-Person Coordination Games. Theory Decision. 40:1996;277-313.
    • (1996) Theory Decision , vol.40 , pp. 277-313
    • Kramarz, F.1
  • 14
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    • On Repeated Games with Complete Information
    • Sorin S. On Repeated Games with Complete Information. Math. Oper. Res. 11:1986;147-160.
    • (1986) Math. Oper. Res. , vol.11 , pp. 147-160
    • Sorin, S.1
  • 15
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    • Communication, Correlation and Symmetry in Bargaining
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    • (1992) Econ. Lett. , vol.39 , pp. 295-300
    • Warneryd, K.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.