Preliminary evidence on the appointment of institutional solutions to franchisor moral Hazard - The case of franchisee councils

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 41-55

  Cochet, Olivier ^a   Ehrmann, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846338520     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1312     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Agrawal D, Lal R. 1995. Contractual arrangements in franchising: an empirical investigation. Journal of Marketing Research 32: 213-221.
2. Ai C, Norton E. 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters 80: 123-129.
3. Anderson B. 2002. Franchisee advisory councils serve as effective conduits. Franchising World 34(6): 9-10.
4. Argote L. 1999. Organizational Learning: Creating, Retaining and Transferring Knowledge. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston, MA.
5. Arruñada B, Garicano L, Vázquez L. 2001. Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: the case of automobile distribution. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17: 257-284.
6. Arruñada B, Garicano L, Vázquez L. 2005. Completing contracts ex-post: how car manufacturers manage their car dealers. Review of Law and Economics 1: 149-173.
7. Bhattacharyya S, Lafontaine F. 1995. Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts. RAND Journal of Economics 26: 761-781.
8. Bloom B. 2003. Cooperation: the key to building lasting franchise relationships. Franchising World 35(6): 27-28.
9. Brickley J. 1999. Incentive conflicts and contractual restraints: evidence from franchising. Journal of Law and Economics 42: 745-774.
10. Coleman J. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
11. Dandridge T, Falbe C. 1994. The influence of franchisees beyond their local domain. International Journal of Small Business 12: 39-49.
12. Dant R, Kaufmann P, Paswan A, 1992. Ownership redirection in franchised channels. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 11: 33-43.
13. Dant R, Nasr N. 1998. Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence. Journal of Business Venturing 13: 3-28.
14. Darr E, Argote L, Epple D. 1995. The acquisition, transfer, and depreciation of knowledge in service organizations: productivity in franchises. Management Science 41: 1750-1762.
15. Darr E, Kurtzberg T. 2000. An investigation of partner similarity dimensions on knowledge transfer. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 82: 28-44.
16. Dnes A. 1996. The economic analysis of franchise contracts. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152: 297-324.
17. Graf H. 2004. Franchisechancen für Deutschland, Österreich und die Schweiz. Verlag für die Deutsche Wirtschaft: Bonn.
18. Greif A, Milgrom P, Weingast B. 1994. Coordination, commitment, and enforcement: the case of the merchant guild. Journal of Political Economy 102: 745-776.
19. Grueneberg S. 2004. Creating and maintaining effective relations with franchisee advisory councils. Franchising World 36(6): 22-23.
20. Hadfield G. 1990. Problematic relations: franchising and the law of incomplete contracts. Stanford Law Review 42: 927-992.
21. Hardy C, Lawrence T, Grant D. 2005. Discourse and collaboration: the role of conversations and collective identity. Academy of Management Review 30: 58-77.
22. Hartmann N. 1997. Franchisenehmerbeiräte: Ökonomische und wettbewerbsrechtliche Beurteilung von Franchisenehmerbeirälen in Franchisesystemen des Handels. GHS: Göttingen.
23. Howe M. 2003. Keys to a successful franchisor-franchisee relationship. Franchising World 35(6): 13-14.
24. Hunt S. 1972. The socioeconomic consequences of the franchise system of distribution. Journal of Marketing 72: 32-38.
25. Jacobsen L. 2004. Whither franchising? The case of Avis Europe PLC. Managerial and Decision Economics 25: 525-535.
26. Kalnins A, Mayer K. 2004. Franchising, ownership, and experience: a study of pizza restaurant survival. Management Science 50: 1716-1728.
27. Kessler U. 2004. Franchise-CD 2004: Euro Edition. Fachverlag U. Kessler: Lohmar.
28. Knight R. 1986. Franchising from the franchisor and franchisee points of view. Journal of Small Business Management 24: 8-15.
29. Knott A. 2003. The organizational routines factor market paradox. Strategic Management Journal 24: 929-943.
30. Lafontaine F. 1992. Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results. RAND Journal of Economics 23: 263-283.
31. Lafontaine F, Shaw K. 1999. The dynamics of franchise contracting: evidence from panel data. Journal of Political Economy 107: 1041-1080.
32. Lal R. 1990. Improving channel coordination through franchising. Marketing Science 9: 299-318.
33. Liao T. 1994. Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit, and other Generalized Linear Models. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.
34. Mathewson G, Winter R. 1985. The economics of franchise contracts. Journal of Law and Economics 28: 503-526.
35. Mathewson G, Winter R. 1994. Territorial restrictions in franchise contracts. Economic Inquiry 32: 181-192.
36. McCosker C, Frazer L, Pensiero D. 1995. An exploration of franchise advisory councils: expectations and relationships. In Proceedings of the Society for Franchising, Dugan A (ed.). Society of Franchising: Minneapolis.
37. Mendelsohn M. 1992. The Guide to Franchising (3rd edn). Cassel: London.
38. Nebel J, Gajewski K. 2003. Die Gremien des Franchisesystems. In Das Franchise-System: Handbuch für Franchisegeber und Franchisenehmer (3rd edn), Nebel J, Schulz A, Flohr E (eds). Luchterhand: Neuwied: 441-451.
39. Norton E, Wang H, Ai C. 2004, Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models. The Stata Journal 4: 103-116.
40. Ostmann S. 1995. Die Macht der Beiräte. Franchise International 1: 26-29.
41. Peckert F, Erdmann G, Kiewitt A, Schindler U. 2005. Franchise und Kooperation 2005. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Frankfurt a. M.
42. Perry R. 1993. The facts about FACs: they work!. Franchising World 25(4): 12-14.
43. Pfister E, Deffains B, Doriat-Duban M, Saussier S. 2004. Institutions and contracts: franchising. Working Paper, Université de Paris 11.
44. Rubin P. 1978. The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract. Journal of Law and Economics 11: 223-233.
45. Scott Jr F. 1995. Franchising vs. company ownership as a decision variable of the firm. Review of Industrial Organization 10: 69-81.
46. Seideman T. 1997. Sharing power, creating wealth: franchising in the '90s. Franchising World 29(3): 11-14.
47. Sen K. 1993. The use of initial fees and royalties in business-format franchising. Managerial and Decision Economics 14: 175-190.
48. Shane S. 2001. Organizational incentives and organizational mortality. Organization Science 12: 136-160.
49. Stanworth J. 1995. The franchise relationship: entrepreneurship or dependence. In Franchising: Contemporary Issues and Research, Kaufmann P, Dant R (eds). The Haworth Press: New York; 161-176.
50. Vâzquez L. 2005. Up-front franchise fees and ongoing variable payments as substitutes: an agency perspective. Review of Industrial Organization 26: 445-460.
51. Windsperger J. 2003. Complementarities and substitutabilities in franchise contracting: some results from the German franchise sector. Journal of Management and Governance 7: 291-313.
52. Windsperger J. 2004. Centralization of franchising networks: evidence from the Austrian franchise sector. Journal of Business Research 57: 1361-1369.