Up-front franchise fees and ongoing variable payments as substitutes: An agency perspective

Review of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 445-460

  Vázquez, Luis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALAMANCA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Contract; Franchising; Ongoing variable payment; Royalty rate; Up front fee

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE;

EID: 18344362992     PISSN: 0889938X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-005-0983-z     Document Type: Article

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