The "newest" separation of powers: Semipresidentialism

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 93-121

  Skach, Cindy ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33846337177     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mol025     Document Type: Article

References (159)

1. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (2000).
2. Id. at 636.
3. Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U. S. Constitution, 18 Const. Comment. 51, 53 (2001).
4. On the Russian case, in particular, see Timothy J. Colton & Cindy, The Russian Predicament: A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism, 16 J. Democracy 113 (July 2005).
5. Arend Lijphart, Introduction to Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government 1, 8 (Arend Lijphart ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
6. See also Armel Le Divellec, Die dualistische Variante des Parlamentarismus: Eine französische Ansicht zur wissenschaftlichen Fata Morgana des semi-präsidentielien Systems [The Dual Variant of Parliamentarism: A French Perspective on the Illusory Scholarship Concerning Semipresidential Systems], 27 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen [Journal of Parliamentary Questions] 145 (1996)
7. and Arend Lijphart, Trichotomy or Dichotomy?, 31 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 125 (1997).
8. There is to date no English-language monograph on semipresidentialism. The existing treatments of semipresidentialism include two chapters of Werner Kaltefleiter, Die Funktionen des Staatsoberhauptes in der Parlamentarischen Demokratie [The Functions of Heads of State in Parliamentary Democracies] (Westdeutscher 1970)
9. Maurice Duverger, Échec au roi [The king in check] (Albin Michel 1978)
10. Les Régimes semi-présidentiels [Semipresidential Regimes] (Maurice Duverger ed., Presses Univ. de France 1986), which was written before the French experiences with cohabitation;
11. and Chapter 4 of Matthew Soberg Shugart & John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge Univ. Press 1992).
12. Newer works include two chapters in Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (NYU Press 1994)
13. Winfried Steffani, Semi-Präsidentialismus: Ein eigenständiger Systemtyp? Zur Unterscheidung von Legislative und Parlament [Semipresidentialism: A Distinct System Type? Toward a Distinction of Legislature and Parliament], 26 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen [Journal of Parliamentary Questions] 621 (1995)
14. Stefano Ceccanti, Oreste Massari & Gianfranco Pasquino, Semipresidenzialismo: Analisi delle esperienze europee [Semipresidentalism: An Analysis of the European Experience] (Mulino 1996)
15. Horst Bahro, Bernhard H. Bayerlein & Ernst Veser, Duverger's Concept: Semi-presidential Government Revisited, 34 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 201 (Oct. 1998)
16. and the useful conceptual cleaning and empirical contributions in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Robert Elgie ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
17. Indeed, some authors have hastily generalized from France's rather exceptional experience with semipresidentialism. Jonathan Zasloff, for example, remarks that "[s]emi-presidentialism's record, to the extent that it can be determined, is promising, or at least not unpromising." See Jonathan Zasloff, The Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 795, 820(1997).
18. See also Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 86, 95 (2001).
19. This article is adapted from the more extensive treatment of semipresidentialism found in Cindy Skach, Borrowing Constitutional Designs (Princeton Univ. Press 2005).
20. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 963 (1998).
21. Governments can be single party or coalitional and have majority or minority status. Majority governments seem to be the most viable, whereas the least viable seem to be minority governments. See Michael Laver & Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe 142 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990)
22. and Paul V. Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies 97 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1994).
23. See also John D. Huber, How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 577 (1998), for the argument that minority governments have increased portfolio changes across parties, limiting governmental effectiveness.
24. And although Michael Laver, in Government Formation and Public Policy, 33 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 21 (2000), argues that neither coalition governments, nor minority governments, need be weak and unstable, the literature on coalition and minority governments has almost exclusively concerned itself with consolidated democratic systems and has ignored their impact in transitional democracies.
25. These tensions are maximized under divided government, when the president does not enjoy a majority in the legislature, and minimized under unified government. See The Politics of Divided Government (Gary W. Cox & Samuel Kernell eds., Westview Press 1991)
26. Morris Fiorina, Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory, 4 Governance 236 (1991)
27. Morris Fiorina, Divided Government (Macmillan 1992)
28. Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Brookings Institution 1994)
29. and John. J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 821 (1999).
30. See Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, supra note 5, for a recent count of semipresidential countries.
31. Maurice Duverger, Le système politique français: Droit constitutionnel et science politique [The French Political System: Constitutional Law and Political Science] 500-501 (Presses Univ. de France 1996), claims to be the first to use this term. In later works, Duverger goes on to suggest that semipresidentialism was in fact an alternation between presidential and parliamentary phases of government.
32. See Yves Mény, Le système politique français [The French Political System] 98 (Montchrestien 1996) (commenting that, in the French Constitution, "[t]he powers of Head of State are indefinable, literally indefinite, without end...[w]ho could in fact resist such a temptation?").
33. This was the case with Georges Pompidou and his prime ministers. This was also the case in Poland during the first two periods of consolidated majority government.
34. e République [Readings and Rereadings of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic] (Paris, Oct. 7, 1998).
35. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 663.
36. Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton Univ. Press 1948).
37. On the relationship between semipresidentialism and constitutional dictatorship, See Skach, supra note 6, at 12-30 and 49-70.
38. See also Cindy Skach, Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 16 Const. Pol. Econ. 347 (2005).
39. The "conservative" use of emergency powers is discussed in John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 Int'l J. Const. L. (I-CON) 210 (2004).
40. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition 3 (Yale Univ. Press 1971).
41. On path dependence, See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time (Princeton Univ. Press 2004).
42. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 648.
43. That is why François Mitterrand altered the structure of his Socialist Party in an attempt to eliminate various factions within it. See Philip Cerny, Democratic Socialism and the Tests of Power, 6 W. Eur. Pol. 188 (1983).
44. Shugart & Carey, supra note 5, miss this point. Their emphasis on de jure presidential power as a contributing factor to democratic breakdown obscures the fact that political conflict within semipresidentialism varies over time, although the de jure presidential powers remain constant.
45. A majority is stable when it lasts for the entire duration of the legislature, and coherent when "the parties, groups and individuals which compose [the majority] are in agreement concerning essential political trends," Duverger, Échec au Roi, supra note 5, at 91. Theoretically, either the prime minister or the president can enjoy the legislative majority during cohabitation. Empirically, it is usually the prime minister, due to constitutional stipulations or convention, which ensure that the president chooses a prime minister from the largest party or coalition in the legislature.
46. Duverger, Échec au Roi, supra note 5
47. Marie-Anne Cohendet, La Cohabitation: Leçons d'une expérience [Cohabitation: Lessons from an Experience] (Presses Univ. de France 1993).
48. Interestingly, Michael Laver & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies 269 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) argue that "...when the executive does not control a legislative majority in a parliamentary democracy, minority government is, in effect, divided government."
49. Similarly, Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy 257 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) state, "...the similarities between the French and the American cases of divided government are more striking than the differences." However, there are crucial conceptual and analytical distinctions between the divided government, minority government, and what I call divided majority government. For example, presidentialism's divided government is for a fixed term, whereas parliamentarism's minority government can be for a variable term. This crucial difference creates different incentives, and one of the complications with semipresidentialism's divided minority government is that these different incentives are combined. These distinctions become acute in democratizing countries where political institutions tend to be weaker, and party systems more polarized, than in consolidated settings.
50. See also Michael Laver & Kenneth Shepsle, Divided Government: America is Not "Exceptional," 4 Governance 250 (1991),
51. and Fiorina, Divided Government, supra note 9.
52. Kaare Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990), suggests a useful conceptual differentiation between formal minority governments, which receive external legislative support and approach majority status, and substantive minority governments, which remain minority governments even when external support is counted. I follow Strøm's distinction, counting formal minority governments as the functional equivalent of majority governments.
53. The arguments in id.,
54. and Laver & Schofield, supra note 8, that minority government "need not be feared" with respect to democracy are not applicable here. First, their analyses concern parliamentary and not semipresidential systems. Second, they assume (among other things) stable political institutions and well-organized and resourceful political parties, whereas I am interested in how minority governments fare in situations of uncertainty when political institutions are neither stable nor well developed (i.e., in democratic transition and reequilibration).
55. Scott Parrish, Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-95, in Executive Decree Authority 62 (John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
56. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 18.
57. Poland Const., art. 145(2)
58. Portugal Const., art. 130(2).
59. Juan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration, in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes 3, 27-38 (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1978).
60. See id. at 27: "[c]hanges in regime occur with the transfer of legitimacy from one set of political institutions to another. They are brought on by the action of one or more disloyal oppositions that question the existence of the regime and aim at changing it."
61. Giovanni Sartori, Political Development and Political Engineering, 17 Pub. Pol'y 261, 293 (1968)
62. see also, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America 20 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully eds., Stanford Univ. Press 1995).
63. Sartori, supra note 32, at 22.
64. Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 114-125 (Yale Univ. Press 1967)
65. Shugart & Carey, supra note 5, at 226-229
66. and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990 21-46 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
67. Majority formation is only one possible goal of electoral system design. Accurate reflection of minority parties in the legislature is another - often opposite - goal. See Dieter Nohlen, Wahlsysteme der Welt: Daten und Analysen, Ein Handbuch [Electoral Systems of the World: Data and Analyses, A Handbook] 13-18, 48-56 (Piper 1978)
68. and Lijphart, supra note 34, at 10-56.
69. Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (Yale Univ. Press 1992).
70. Another factor within electoral system design is the relative timing of presidential and legislative elections. Evidence to date indicates that presidential and legislative elections held simultaneously are more likely to give a president a majority in the legislature, other things being equal. In semipresidentialism, constitutional prerogatives often allow presidents to call early legislative elections shortly after taking office (or during the term) to try to reequilibrate the presidential and legislative majorities, as Mitterrand did after his election in 1981. But as Sartori, supra note 5, at 179, notes, "[c]oncurrent elections cannot fabricate undivided majorities that are not potentially in the works; but staggered elections do facilitate divided majority outcomes." That said, it does seem to be the case that the electorate is encouraged to vote for the same party in concurrent elections.
71. See also Shugart & Carey, supra note 5, at 229-258 and Appendix B.
72. Only parliamentarism has such incentives, via executive responsibility to the legislature. At the legislative level, closed party lists give parties more control over candidates, reducing the personalization of campaigns, enhancing the value of the party label in local elections, and enabling the party to reward the most loyal rank-and-file members by placing them on the list. See Shugart & Carey, supra note 5, at 171.
73. Actual outsiders have included the aforementioned Perot in the United States, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Stanislaw Tyminski in Poland's 1990 presidential race. Tyminski, described as an "unknown Polish expatriate businessman," running on an antiparty campaign, was able to surpass the previous Solidarity prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in the first round election by a 3.1 per cent margin and advance to the second round against Lech Walesa. See Frances Millard, The Anatomy of the New Poland: Postcommunist Politics in its First Phase 128 (Edward Elgar 1994).
74. In this sense, the semipresidential constitution may not be an effective coordination device, which constitutions must be if they are to contribute to democratic consolidation. On coordination devices, see Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J. Inst'l & Theor. Econ. 286 (1993)
75. and Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 245 (1997).
76. On constitutions and commitment, see Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 Const. Pol. Econ. 137 (1992)
77. and Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution? in The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism 100 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., Agathon Press 1989).
78. These cases were either reequilibrating democracy (France) or were undergoing a process of democratization (Weimar, Russia). Democratization is, at a procedural minimum, the "...process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles..., or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations..., or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation." Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies 8 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1986).
79. Here I am concerned not only with democratization, so defined, but also with the consolidation and stability of democracy, which has attitudinal and behavioral dimensions in addition to procedural ones. Juan J. linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1996).
80. The discussions of France draw on Skach supra note 6,
81. and Skach, supra note 17.
82. Dorothy Pickles, The Fifth French Republic 209-210 (Methuen 1966).
83. John D. Huber, Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France 26 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
84. Pickles, supra note 43, at 143-144
85. Bernard Chantebout, Droit constitutionnel et science politique [Constitutional Law and Political Science] 493 (Armand Colin 1988)
86. Jean Gicquel, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques [Constitutional Law and Political Institutions] 590 (Montchrestien 1997)
87. Vincent Wright, The Government and Politics of France 16 (Routledge, 3d ed. 1996)
88. and John D. Huber, Executive Decree Authority in France, in Executive Decree Authority 233 (John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
89. The presidential mandate was changed, by referendum, to five years in September 2000.
90. 9 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 19159 (1963).
91. Sondages: Revue française de l'opinion publique [French Review of Public Opinion] 85 (1963).
92. E République [The Political Parties of the Fifth Republic] (Montchrestien 1998).
93. From 1958 to 1986, and then from 1988 to the present, a majority plurality formula has been used for the National Assembly. This system requires an absolute majority for victory in the first round, or a plurality for victory in the second round. The second round is limited to parties having passed a threshold, which has increased from 5 per cent of the registered electorate in 1958, to 10 per cent in 1966, and 12.5 per cent in 1976. See Duverger, supra note 11, at 495-500
94. and Pierre Martin, Les systèmes électoraux et les modes de scrutin [Electoral Systems and Voting Methods] 121-133 (Montchrestien 1994).
95. Over de Gaulle's tenure, the percentage of ministers and secretaries of state from the UNR increased steadily: 31 per cent under Debré, 34 per cent under Pompidou 1, 54 per cent under Pompidou II, 55 per cent under Pompidou III, and 84 per cent under Couve de Murville in 1968. Data from 5-15 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1959-1969). After 1967, the UNR was transformed into the Union des démocrates pour la République (UDR).
96. There were divided minority governments from 1988 to 1993. On these years, see Robert Elgie & Moshe Maor, Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991, 15 W. Eur. Pol. 57 (1992)
97. and Huber, supra note 44.
98. E République [Governments and Assemblies of the Fifth Republic (1996)
99. and 8-15 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1962-1969).
100. Jean Charlot, The Gaullist Phenomenon 146 (Monica Charlot & Marianne Neighbour trans., Praeger 1971).
101. Dorothy Pickles, The Government and Politics of France: Volume II, Politics 70 (Methuen 1973).
102. On economic planning in this period, see Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France 146-149 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986).
103. In 1963, the Pompidou government created the Délegation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale [Regional Development Agency] (DATAR), which was meant as a center of knowledge for regional planning. See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, Paris and the Provinces: The Politics of Local Government Reform in France 102 (Univ. of California Press 1980)
104. and Jonah D. Levy, Tocqueville's Revenge: State, Society, and Economy in Contemporary France 32, 39-41 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
105. Jean Charlot, Les Français et de Gaulle [The French and De Gaulle] 46 (Plon 1971).
106. See Jean-Marc reproche à Jacques Chirac de bloquer la réforme du CSM [Jean-Marc Reproaches Jacques Chirac for Blocking CSM Reforms], Le Monde, Dec. 29, 1998, at 7
107. e, République menacée par la cohabitation [The Fifth Republic Threatened by Cohabitation], Le Monde, Jan. 1, 1999, at 1.
108. Roy Pierce, The Executive Divided Against Itself: Cohabitation in France, 1986-1988, 4 Governance 270 (1991)
109. and Jean V. Poulard, The French Double Executive and the Experience of Cohabitation, 105 Pol. Sci. Q. 243 (1990).
110. Walter Tormin, Geschichte der deutschen Parteien seit 1848 [History of German Political Parties since 1948] 23-45 (Kohlhammer 1968)
111. M. Rainer Lepsius, Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur [Party System and Social Structure], in Deutsche Parteien vor 1918 [German Political Parties before 1918] 40 (Gerhard A. Ritter ed., Kienpenheuer u. Witsch 1973)
112. and M. Rainer Lepsius, From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist Takeover: Germany, in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe 34 (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1978).
113. Ferdinand A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy?: A Study of Proportional Representation (Univ. of Notre Dame 1941)
114. Friedrich Schafer, Zur Frage des Wahlrechts in der Weimarer Republik [The Question of Voting Rights in the Weimar Republic], in Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik: Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning [The State, Economics and Politics in the Weimar Republic: Anniversary for Heinrich Brüning] 119 (Ferdinand A. Hermans & Theodor Schieder eds., Duncker u. Humblot 1967)
115. and Nohlen, supra note 35, at 209-213.
116. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Hindenburg: The Wooden Titan (William Morrow 1936)
117. Erich Marcks, Hindenburg: Feldmarschall und Reichspräsident [Hindenberg: Field Marshal and State President] (Musterschmidt 1963)
118. and Andreas Dorpalen, Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic (Princeton Univ. Press 1964).
119. See the data collected in 109/110 Informationen zur politischen Bildung: Die Weimarer Republik [Information for Political Education: The Weimar Republic] (Franzis 1988).
120. Hans Mommsen, Die Sozialdemokratie in der Defensive: Der Immobilismus der SPD und der Aufstief des Nationalsozialismus [Social Democracy on the Defensive: The Immobilism of the Social Democratic Party and the Rise of National Socialism], in Sozialdemokratie zwischen Klasseneewegung und Volkspartei [Social Democracy Between Class Movement and People's Party] 106-133 (Hans Mommsen ed., Cornelsen 1974).
121. Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Consequences of National Socialism 77 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1971).
122. "Calculated from data in Die Weimarer Republik, 1918-1933 [The Weimar Republic, 1918-1933] (Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke & Hans-Adolf Jacobsen eds., Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 1988).
123. See also Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie [Dissolution of the Weimar Republic: A Study of the Problem of the Deterioration of Power in Democracy] (Ring 1955).
124. Horst Möller, Weimar: Die unvollendete Demokratie [The Unfinished Democracy] 288 (Deutscher Taschenbuch 1997).
125. William L. Patch, Jr., Heinrich Brüning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic 72 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
126. On Brüning's dismissal, see id;
127. and Hans Mommsen, Heinrich Brüning's Politik als Reichskanzler: Das Scheitern eines politischen Alleinganges [Heinrich Brüning's Politics as Chancellor of the Reich: The Failure of a Political Loner], in Wirtschaftskrise und liberale Democratie: Das Ende der Weimarer Republik und die Gegenwärtige Situation [Economic Crisis and Liberal Democracy: The End of the Weimar Republic and the Current Situation] 16 (Karl Holl ed., Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1978).
128. Carl Schmitt defended the Reich government before the court. His defense is found in Carl Schmitt, Die Verfassungsmässigkeit der Bestellung eines Reichskommissars für das Land Preussen [The Constitutionality of a Reich Commisar for the State of Prussia], 15 Deutsche Juristen Zeitung [German Law Journal] 954 (1932).
129. The court's decision is found in Preussen contra Reich vor dem Staatsgerichtshof: Stenogrammbericht der Verhandlungen vor dem Staatsgerichtshof in Leipzig [Prussia Versus the Reich: Transcript of Proceedings before the State Court in Leipzig] (Oct. 10-14 and 17, 1932).
130. See also David Dyzenhaus, Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons?, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 121 (1997)
131. Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (Duke Univ. Press 1997)
132. and John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
133. Bracher, supra note 65
134. and Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (Addison-Wesley 1996).
135. For a longer discussion, see Colton & Skach, supra note 4.
136. See id. for a longer, more detailed discussion of the Russian case.
137. Interview with Galina Starovoytova, former adviser to Yeltsin on ethnopolitical issues (1991-92) and member of the State Duma until her assassination in 1998, in Moscow (Mar. 26, 1998).
138. Peter C. Ordeshook, Russia's Party System: Is Russian Federalism Viable?, 12 Post-Soviet Affairs 195 (July Sept. 1996).
139. See Stephen White, Richard Rose & Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes 237-239 (Chatham House 1997).
140. Stephen Whitefield & Geoffrey Evans, Support for Democracy and Political Opposition in Russia, 1993-1995, 12 Post-Soviet Affairs 218 (July Sept. 1996).
141. Calculated from data in John Barber, Opposition in Russia, 32 Gov't & Opposition 598 (1997)
142. and 37-47 Keesing's Record of World Events (1991-2001).
143. Alexander M. Yakovlev, Striving for Law in a Lawless Land: Memoirs of a Russian Reformer 130 (M.E. Sharpe 1996). Yakovlev, a legal scholar and former legislator, was a key adviser to the committee that drafted the 1993 constitution. He later served as presidential plenipotentiary to the Federal Assembly.
144. Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (M.E. Sharpe 1999), especially ch. 4.
145. Interview with Sergey Kovalev, Russian Commissioner for Human Rights in 1994, in Moscow (Mar. 26, 1998).
146. Archie Brown, The October Crisis of 1993: Context and Implications, 9 Post-Soviet Affairs 183 (July Sept. 1993)
147. Michael McFaul, State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia, 47 World Pol. 210 (Oct. 1994)
148. and Timothy J. Colton, Boris Yeltsin: Russia's All Thumbs Democrat, in Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership 49-74 (Timothy J. Colton & Robert C. Tucker eds., Westview Press 1995).
149. In the wake of this arrested transition, there have been an increasing number of articles calling for constitutional reform. See, e.g., the early pieces, Izmenenie Konstitutsii?[Constitutional Changes?], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Nov. 6, 1998, at 1-3
150. and Rossiya: Desyat' voprosov o samom vazhnom, translated in Russia: Ten Important Political Questions (Liliya Shevtsova ed., Carnegie Center 1997).
151. VTsIOM survey available at http://www.russiavotes.org, Richard Rose's data web site.
152. See also Richard Rose, Getting Things Done With Social Capital: New Russia Barometer VII (Univ. of Strathclyde Centre for the Study of Public Policy 1998).
153. Levada Center nationwide survey, May 2005, available at http://www.russiavotes.org.
154. Colton & Skach, supra note 4, at 122.
155. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in Constitutionalism and Democracy 195, 237 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993).
156. Skach, supra note 6, at 126.
157. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 56. I disagree with Calabresi, however, that these are the critical criteria.
158. Terry M. Moe, Power and Political Institutions, 3 Persp. on Pol. 215, 215 (2005).
159. See Regimes and Oppositions 25 (Robert A. Dahl ed., Yale Univ. Press 1973).