Power and Political Institutions

Perspectives on Politics

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 215-233

  Moe, Terry M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644920497     PISSN: 15375927     EISSN: 15410986     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592705050176     Document Type: Article

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