Constitutional origins of dictatorship and democracy

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 347-368

  Skach, Cindy ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Parliamentary; Presidential; Semi presidential; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 28144448900     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-4316-x     Document Type: Article

References (131)

1. Arend Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government 8 (1992).
2. Also see Armel Le Divellec, Die dualistische Variante des Parlamentarismus: Eine französische Ansicht zur wissenschaftlichen Fata Morgana des semi-präsidentiellen Systems, 27 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 145-51 (1996);
3. and Lijphart, Trichotomy or Dichotomy, 33 European Journal of Political Research 125-28 (1997).
4. There is to date no English language monograph on semi-presidentialism. The existing treatments of semi-presidentialism include two chapters of Werner Kaltefleiter, Die Funktionen des Staatsoberhauptes in der Parlamentarischen Demokratie (1970);
5. Maurice Duverger, Échec au roi (1978);
6. and Les régimes semi-présidentiels (Maurice Duverger, ed., 1986), which was written before the French experiences with co-habitation;
7. and Chapter 4 of Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (1992).
8. Newer works include two chapters in Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (1994);
9. Winfried Steffani, Semi-Präsidentialismus: ein eigenständiger Systemtyp? Zur Unterscheidung von Legislative und Parlament, 26 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 621-41 (1995);
10. Stefano Ceccanti, Oreste Massari and Gianfranco Pasquino, Semipresidenzialismo: Analisi delle Esperienze Europee (1996);
11. Horst Bahro, Bernhard H. Bayerlein and Ernst Veser, Duverger's Concept: Semi-Presidential Government Revisited, 34 European Journal of Political Research, 201-24 (1998);
12. and the useful conceptual cleaning and empirical contributions in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Robert Elgie, ed., 1999). Indeed, some authors have hastily generalized from France's rather exceptional experience with semi-presidentialism. Jonathan Zasloff, for example, remarks that "[s]emi-presidentialism's record, to the extent that it can be determined, is promising, or at least, not unpromising." See id., The Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 795, 820 (1997).
13. Also see Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies, 95 American Journal of International Law 86, 95 (2001).
14. For a more comprehensive treatment, see my Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic, Princeton (2005).
15. Governments can be single-party or coalitional, and have majority or minority status. Majority governments seem to be the most viable, whereas the least viable seem to be minority governments. See Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government 142 (1990);
16. and Paul V. Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies 97 (1994).
17. Also see John D. Huber, How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, 92 American Political Science Review 577-91 (1998), for the argument that minority governments have increased portfolio changes across parties, limiting governmental effectiveness.
18. And although Michael Laver, in Government Formation and Public Policy, 33 PS: Political Science and Politics 21-23 (2000), argues that neither coalition governments, nor minority governments, need be weak and unstable, the literature on coalition and minority governments has almost exclusively concerned itself with consolidated democratic systems, and has ignored their impact in transitional democracies.
19. These tensions are maximized under divided government, when the president does not enjoy a majority in the legislature, and minimized under unified government. See The Politics of Divided Government (Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., 1991);
20. Morris Fiorina, Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory, 4 Governance: An International Journal of Political Administration, 236-49 (1991);
21. Fiorina, Divided Government (1992);
22. Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (1994);
23. and John. J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, 93 American Political Science Review 821-35 (1999).
24. See elgie (1999).
25. Maurice Duverger, Le système politique français: droit constitutionnel et science politique 500-01 (1996), claims to be the first to use this term. In later works, Duverger went on to suggest that semi-presidentialism was in fact an alternation between presidential and parliamentary phases of government.
26. See Yves Mény, Le système politique français 98 (1996), who notes that in the French constitution, "[t]he powers of Head of State are indefinable, literally indefinite, without end...[w]ho could in fact resist such a temptation?"
27. Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (1948).
28. On the relationship between semi-presidentialism and constitutional dictatorship, see Skach, Borrowing Constitutional Designs, pp. 12-30, and 49-70.
29. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition 235-36 (1971).
30. That is why François Mitterrand altered the structure of his Socialist Party in an attempt to eliminate various factions within it. See Philip Cerny, Democratic Socialism and the Tests of Power, 6 West European Politics 188-202 (1983).
31. This was the case with Georges Pompidou and his prime ministers. This was also the case in Poland during the first two periods of consolidated majority government.
32. e République (Paris, October 7, 1998).
33. Shugart and Carey, supra note 1, miss this point. Their emphasis on de jure presidential power as a contributing factor to democratic breakdown obscures the fact that political conflict within semipresidentialism varies over time, although the de jure presidential powers remain constant.
34. A majority is stable when it lasts for the entire duration of the legislature, and coherent when "the parties, groups and individuals which compose [the majority] are in agreement concerning essential political trends," Duverger, supra note. 1, p. 91. Theoretically, either the prime minister or the president can enjoy the legislative majority during cohabitation. Empirically, it is usually the prime minister, due to constitutional stipulations or convention, which ensure that the president chooses a prime minister from the largest party or coalition in the legislature.
35. Duverger, supra note 1; Marie-Anne Cohendet, La Cohabitation: Leçons d'une Expérience (1993).
36. Interestingly, Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies 269 (1996)
37. argue that, "...when the executive does not control a legislative majority in a parliamentary democracy, minority government is, in effect, divided government." Similarly, Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy 257 (1995) state, "...the similarities between the French and the American cases of divided government are more striking than the differences." However, there are crucial conceptual and analytical distinctions between the divided government, minority government, and what I call divided majority government. For example, presidentialism's divided government is for a fixed term, whereas parliamentarism's minority government can be for a variable term. This crucial difference creates different incentives, and one of the complications with semi-presidentialism's divided minority government is that these different incentives are combined. These distinctions become acute in democratizing countries where political institutions tend to be weaker, and party systems more polarized, than in consolidated settings.
38. Also see Laver and Shepsle, Divided Government: America is Not 'Exceptional: 4 Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 250-69 (1991),
39. and Fiorina, supra note 4.
40. Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule (1990), suggests a useful conceptual differentiation between formal minority governments, which receive external legislative support and approach majority status, and substantive minority governments, which remain minority governments even when external support is counted. I follow Strom's distinction, counting formal minority governments as the functional equivalent of majority governments.
41. The arguments in id., and Laver, supra note 3, that minority government "need not be feared" with respect to democracy are not applicable here. First, their analyses concern parliamentary, and not semi-presidential, systems. Second, they assume (among other things) stable political institutions, and well-organized and resourceful political parties, whereas I am interested in how minority governments fare in situations of uncertainty when political institutions are neither stable nor well developed (i.e., in democratic transition and re-equilibration).
42. The longer treatment of the Russian case is found in Timothy J. Colton and Cindy Skach, The Russian Predicament, 16 Journal of Democracy 113-126 (2005).
43. Also see Scott Parrish, Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-95, in Executive Decree Authority 62-103 (John M. Carcy and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds.1998).
44. Juan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, & Recquilibration, part of The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes 27-38 (Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., 1978). See id. p. 27, who states, "[c]hanges in regime occur with the transfer of legitimacy from one set of political institutions to another. They are brought on by the action of one or more disloyal oppositions that question the existence of the regime and aim at changing it."
45. There are also two conditions that do not explain or predict a country's placement or movement among the different subtypes of semi-presidentialism, but rather, influence whether - once in a subtype - conflict will be exacerbated or mitigated. One condition concerns powers constitutionally granted to a president, on the one hand, and the extent to which a president uses these powers, on the other hand. A second condition concerns the set of specific legislative and agenda rules which affect the power of governments vis-à-vis the legislature, and those determining the role of a country's constitutional court as a moderating power.
46. Giovanni Sartori, Political Development and Political Engineering, 17 Public Policy 261-98, 293 (1966);
47. and Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America 20 (Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., 1995).
48. Id, 22.
49. See William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962), especially his discussion of bargaining through side-payments, 105-123.
50. Mainwaring and Scully, supra note 22.
51. Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 114-25 (1967);
52. Shugart and Carey, supra note 1, pp. 226-229;
53. and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990 21-46 (1994).
54. Majority formation is only one possible goal of electoral system design. Accurate reflection of minority parties in the legislature is another - often opposite - goal. See Dieter Nohlen, Wahlsysteme der Welt: Daten und Analysen, Ein Handbuch 13-18, 48-56 (1978);
55. and Lijphart, supra note 25, pp. 10-56.
56. Another factor within electoral system design is the relative timing of presidential and legislative elections. Evidence to date indicates that presidential and legislative elections held simultaneously are more likely to give a president a majority in the legislature, other things being equal. In semi-presidentialism, constitutional prerogatives often allow presidents to call early legislative elections shortly after taking office (or during the term) to try to re-equilibrate the presidential and legislative majorities, as Mitterrand did after his election in 1981. But as Sartori, supra note 1, p. 179 notes, "[c]oneurrent elections cannot fabricate undivided majorities that are not potentially in the works; but staggered elections do facilitate divided majority outcomes". This said, it does seem to be the case that the electorate is encouraged to vote for the same party in concurrent elections.
57. Also see Shugart and Carey, supra note 1, pp. 229-258 and Appendix B.
58. Domenico Fisichella, Elezioni e Democrazia: Un'analisi Comparata 274-86 (1982);
59. and Sartori, supra note 1, pp. 61-69.
60. Jean-Luc Parodi, Le nouvel espace politique français, in Idéologies, partis politiques, et groupes sociaux 49-60, 55 (Yves Mény, ed., 1991).
61. Although, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957);
62. Downs' model suggests that electors vote for policies, and that parties are political entrepreneurs who will alter their policies (those they are not particularly attached to) in order to attract the greatest percentage of votes. Also see Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States 26-31 (1990).
63. In other words, "...a bipolar [party] system assumes a normal, bell-curve distribution (a Gauss-Laplace curve) of where the electors place themselves along a left-right (or other) continuum, whereas bipolarization assumes a double-peaked distribution of political opinion with an almost empty center." See Sartori, supra note 1, p. 14.
64. This is the actual percentage the French presidential candidate Jacques Chirac won in the first round presidential elections on April 23, 1995. The second round, limited to the two front-runners, which included Chirac and Socialist Party candidate Lionel Jospin, gave him 52.63%.
65. Only parliamentarism has such incentives, via executive responsibility to the legislature. At the legislative level, closed party lists give parties more control over candidates, reducing the personalization of campaigns, enhancing the value of the party label in local elections, and enabling the party to reward the most loyal rank-and-file members by placing them on the list. See Shugart and Carey, supra note 1, p. 171.
66. Actual "outsiders" have included the aforementioned Perot in the United States, Fujimori in Peru, and Tyminski in Poland's 1990 presidential race. Tyminski, described as an "unknown Polish expatriate businessman," running on an anti-party campaign, was able to pass up the previous Solidarity prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the first round election by a 3.1% margin, and advance to the second round against Lech Walesa. See Frances Millard, The Anatomy of the New Poland: Postcommunist Politics in its First Phase 128 (1994).
67. Thus neither Shugart and Carey, supra note 2,
68. nor George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicamerialism and Multipartyism, 25 British Journal of Political Science 289-325 (1995), are adequately able to explain the causal mechanism of regime instability in semi-presidentialism. Tsebelis is interested in presidents' constitutional veto power over legislation, ignoring other important presidential powers such as emergency and decree powers. Moreover, legitimacy erosion and democratic breakdown can emanate from a president's reaction to his position of impotence vis-à-vis the legislature, which itself emanates from the president's poor relationship to, or ideological distance from, parties in the legislature.
69. In this sense, the semi-presidential constitution may not be an effective coordination device which constitutions must be if they are to contribute to democratic consolidation. On coordination devices see Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 286-311 (1993);
70. and id, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 American Political Science Review 245-63 (1997). On constitutions and commitment,
71. see Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 Constitutional Political Economy 137-75 (1992);
72. and Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution? in The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism 100-20 (Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., 1989).
73. Democratization is, at a procedural minimum, the "...process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles..., or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations..., or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation." Sec Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies 8 (1986). Here I am concerned not only with democratization so defined, but also, with the consolidation and stability of democracy, which has attitudinal and behavioral dimensions in addition to procedural ones.
74. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe (1996).
75. This is a contribution, given the almost complete lack of existing knowledge concerning semi-presidentialism's relationship to democracy. Once more evidence becomes available from the new and existing semi-presidential democracies, further testing of this relationship through large-n statistical analysis could be undertaken. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research 214-15 (1994). For the merits of crucial cases,
76. see Harry Eckstein, Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in 1 Handbook of Political Science, Political Science: Scope and Theory (Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 1975);
77. and Giovanni Sartori, Comparing and Miscomparing 3 Journal of Theoretical Politics 243-57 (1991).
78. Dorothy Pickles, the Fifth French Republic 209-10 (1966).
79. John D. Huber, Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France 234-35 (1996).
80. Pickles, supra note 43, pp. 209-210;
81. Bernard Chantebout, Droit constitutionnel et science politique 493 (1988);
82. Jean Gicquel, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques 590 (1997);
83. Vincent Wright, The Government and Politics of France 16 (1996);
84. and John D. Huber, Executive Decree Authority in France, in Executive Decree Authority 233-53 (John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., 1998).
85. The presidential mandate was changed, by referendum, to five years in September 2000.
86. Keesings Contemporary Archives 19159 (1963).
87. Sondages: Revue française de l'opinion publique 85 (1963).
88. e république (1989).
89. From 1958 to 1986, and then from 1988 to the present, a majority-plurality formula has been used for the National Assembly. This system requires an absolute majority for victory in the first round, or a plurality for victory in the second round. The second round is limited to parties having passed a threshold, which has increased from 5% of the registered electorate in 1958, to 10% in 1966, and 12.5% in 1976. See Duverger, supra note 6, pp. 495-500;
90. and Pierre Martin, Les systèmes electoraux et les modes de scrutin 121-33 (1994).
91. Over de Gaulle's tenure, the percentage of ministers and secretaries of state from the UNR increased steadily: 31% under Debré, 34% under Pompidou I, 54% under Pompidou II, 55% under Pompidou III, and 84% under Couve de Murville in 1968. Data from Keesings Contemporary Archives (1959-1969). After 1967, the UNR was transformed into the Union des démocrates pour la République (UDR).
92. Formally, there was a minority government from 1988 to 1993; but as the Socialists governed alternatively with support from the Communists and the Gaullists, they substantively enjoyed majority status. On these years see Robert Elgie and Moshe Maor, Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991 15 west European Politics 57-74 (1992);
93. and Huber, supra note 40.
94. e république (1996); and Keesing's Contemporary Archives.
95. Jean Charlot, The Gaullist Phenomenon 146 (1970).
96. Dorothy Pickles, The Government and Politics of France: Volume II, 70 (1973).
97. On economic planning in this period, see Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France 146-49 (1986). In 1963, the Pompidou government created the Délegation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale (DATAR), which was meant as a center of knowledge for regional planning.
98. See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, Paris and the Provinces: The Politics of Local Government Reform in France 102 (1980);
99. and Jonah D. Levy, Tocqueville's Revenge: State, Society, and Economy in Contemporary France 32, 39-41 (1999).
100. Jean Charlot, Les Français et de Gaulle 46 (1971).
101. Roy Pierce, The Executive Divided Against Itself: Cohabitation in France, 1986-1988 4 Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 270-94 (1991);
102. and Jean V. Poulard, The French Double Executive and the Experience of Cohabitation 105 Political Science Quarterly Vol. 105 243-67 (1990).
103. See Jean-Marc Reproche à Jacques Chirac de bloquer la réforme du CSM, Le Monde, December 29, 1998, p. 7;
104. e République menacée par la cohabitation, Le Monde, January 1, 1999, p. 1.
105. Walter Tormin, Geschichte der Deutschen Parteien seit 1848, 23-45 (1968);
106. Rainer M. Lepsius, Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur, in Die Deutschen Parteien vor 1918, 40-63 (Gerhard A. Ritter, ed., 1973);
107. and id., From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist Takeover: Germany, in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe, 34-79 (Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., 1978).
108. F. A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation (1941);
109. Friedrich Schafer, Zur Frage des Wahlrechts in der Weimarer Republik, in Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik: Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning, 119-40 (F. A. Hermans and T. Schieder, eds., 1967);
110. and Nohlen, supra note 26, pp. 209-213.
111. See the discussion in Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert, Voting in Democracies 155 (1955);
112. also see the discussion of Lakeman and Lambert, and omitted variable bias in analyses of PR's role in Weimar's breakdown, in King, Keohane, and Verba, supra note 38, p. 190.
113. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Hindenburg: The Wooden Titan (1936);
114. Erich Marcks and Walther Hubatsch, Hindenburg: Feldmarschall und Reichspräsident (1963);
115. and Andreas Dorpalen, Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic (1964).
116. See the data collected in 109/110 Informationen zur politischen Bildung: Die Weimarer Republik, (1988).
117. This data is drawn from Skach (2005), calculated from data in Die Weimarer Republik, 1918-1933 (Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, eds., 1988).
118. Also see Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie (1984) (1955).
119. Hans Mommsen, Die Sozialdemokratie in der Defensive: Der Immobilismus der SPD und der Aufstief des Nationalsozialismus, in Sozialdemokratie zwischen Klassenbewegung und Volkspartei, 106-33 (id., ed., 1974).
120. Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Consequences of National Socialism 77 (1971).
121. Horst Möller, Weimar: Die unvollendete Demokratie 288 (1997).
122. William L. Patch, Jr., Heinrich Brüning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic 72 (1998).
123. On Brünings dismissal, see Patch, supra;
124. and Hans Mommsen, Heinrich Brüning's Politik als Reichskanzler: Das Scheitern eines politischen Alleinganges in Wirtschaftskrise und liberale Demokratie. Das Ende der Weimarer Republik und die gegenwärtige Situation 16-45 (Karl Holl, ed., 1978).
125. Carl Schmitt defended the Reich government before the court. His defense is found in Schmitt, Die Verfassungsmässigkeit der Bestellung eines Reichskommissars für das Land Preussen, 15 Deutsche Juristenzeitung, 954-58 (1932). The court's decision is found in Preussen contra Reich vor dem Staatsgerichtshof: Stenogrammbericht der Verhandlungen vor dem Staatsgerichtshof in Leipzig vom 10. Bis 14. und vom 17. Oktober 1932 (1932).
126. Also see David Dyzenhaus, Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons? 91 American Political Science Review 121-34 (1997);
127. Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (1997);
128. and John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (1997).
129. Bracher, supra note 63;
130. and Henry Ashby, Turner, Jr., Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (1996).
131. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in Constitutionalism and Democracy 95-240, 237 (Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., 1993), as quoted in Skach (2005).