Computational secrecy by typing for the Pi calculus

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4279 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 253-269

  Abadi, Martín ^a,b   Corin, Ricardo ^a,c   Fournet, Cédric ^a  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; POLYNOMIALS; PROBABILISTIC LOGICS; PROGRAM COMPILERS; THEOREM PROVING;

COMPUTATIONAL SECRECY; FORMAL SECRECY PROPERTIES; PI CALCULUS; SIMPLE TYPE SYSTEMS;

OBJECT ORIENTED PROGRAMMING;

EID: 33845921212     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11924661_16     Document Type: Conference Paper

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