Brooks and Wohlforth reply

International Security

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 186-191

  Brooks, Stephen G ^a   Wohlforth, William C ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33645738624     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.186     Document Type: Letter

References (18)

1. Robert Art, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance,"" International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 177-185. Further citations to this letter to the editors appear parenthetically in the text.
2. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 72-108.
3. Art, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance";
4. Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing";
5. Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7-45;
6. TV. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46-71;
7. and Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 109-139.
8. In 2003, the United States spent 3.7 percent of its gross domestic product on defense while China spent 3.9 percent. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2004-05 (London: IISS, 2004). It should be noted that the IISS estimate of Chinese defense spending is based on a purchasing-power-parity formula that dramatically increases its estimated spending over official figures.
9. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy";
10. and Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States."
11. See the analysis and citations in Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," pp. 76-79.
12. For more, see Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Autumn 2005), pp. 1-33.
13. Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," p. 82.
14. Since our article was published, a number of significant analyses have been produced that coincide with our overall assessment of the ESDP. See, for example, Center for Strategic and International Studies, European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2005).
15. David Kerr's recent analysis reinforces our underlying conclusion: "The primary geopolitical gain to Russia and China of their partnership has been bilateral. . . . Balancing behavior has never been a declared end of the Sino-Russian partnership. . . . A Sino-Russian alliance could never compensate the two parties for the things they would lose by isolating themselves from the U.S.-dominated international system." Kerr, "The Sino-Russian Partnership and U.S. Policy toward North Korea," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 415, 417.
16. Avery Goldstein, "China's Grand Strategy and U.S. Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 27, 2005. As Goldstein notes, after the mid-1990s there was a clear recognition in China that "contrary to the belief when the Cold War ended, the world was not quickly going to become multipolar. Instead, unipolarity would last for decades, with the U.S. remaining the world's sole superpower. . . . Although China's economic and military capabilities were growing as a result of the reform program in place since 1979, it still lagged far behind the world's leading states, especially the U.S. Perhaps most significantly, China's leaders . . . more clearly recognized just how far they had to go before their armed forces were in the same league as those of the U.S. and its allies."
17. See the related analysis in Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005). Peter Gries's review of recent Chinese analysts' writings on the United States reaches the same finding: "While many Chinese have convinced themselves that U.S. power predominance cannot last, they do grudgingly acknowledge the world's current unipolar nature. This view represents a dramatic shift from the early 1990s, when many Chinese held out hope for a multipolar international system. . . . While some elements of resistance remain, Chinese strategy today has largely shifted away from balancing and towards bandwagoning."
18. See Gries, "China Eyes the Hegemon," Orbis, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 406.