Selection into and across credit contracts: Theory and field research

Journal of Econometrics

Volumn 136, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 665-698

  Ahlin, Christian ^a   Townsend, Robert M ^b,c  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^c FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Empirical contract theory; Joint liability; Mechanism design; Micro credit

Indexed keywords

CORRELATION METHODS; DATA ACQUISITION; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; VIRTUAL CORPORATION;

ADVERSE SELECTION; EMPIRICAL CONTRACT THEORY; JOINT LIABILITY; MECHANISM DESIGN; MICROCREDIT;

CONTRACTS;

EID: 33845322587     PISSN: 03044076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.11.013     Document Type: Article

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