Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 103, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 282-310

  Prescott, Edward Simpson ^a   Townsend, Robert M ^b,c  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^c FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Collusion; Econometric tests; Inequality; Moral hazard; Organizations; Risk sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036240349     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2874     Document Type: Article

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