Repeated auctions with complementarities

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3937 LNAI, Issue , 2006, Pages 16-29

  'T Hoen, P J ^a   La Poutre J A ^b  

^a CWI   (Netherlands)

^b EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ECONOMICS; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; PROBLEM SOLVING; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

BIDDING STRATEGIES; SINGLE SHOT AUCTIONS; ZERO MARGINAL PROFITS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33845199343     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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