Structural constraints on partisan bias under the efficient gerrymander

Public Choice

Volumn 100, Issue 1-2, 1999, Pages 65-84

  Gilligan, Thomas W ^a   Matsusaka, John G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033409668     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018344022501     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Abramowitz, A. (1984). Partisan redistricting and the 1982 congressional elections. Journal of Politics 45: 767-770.
2. Balinski, M.L. and Young, H.P. (1982). Fair responsiveness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
3. Black, D. (1958). The theory of committees and elections. London: Cambridge University Press.
4. Born, R. (1985). Partisan intentions and election day realities in the congressional redistricting process. American Political Science Review 79: 305-319.
5. Cain, B.E. (1984). The reapportionment puzzle. Berkeley: University of California Press.
6. Cain, B.E. (1985). Assessing the partisan effects of redistricting. American Journal of Political Science 79: 320-333.
7. Campagna, J. and Grofman, B. (1990). Party control and partisan bias in 1980s congressional redistricting. Journal of Politics 52: 1242-1258.
8. Cranor, J.D., Crawley, G.L. and Scheele, R.H. (1989). The anatomy of a gerrymander. American Journal of Political Science 33: 222-239.
9. Gelman, A. and King, G. (1994). Enhancing democracy through legislative redistricting. American Political Science Review 88: 541-559.
10. Gilligan, T.W. and Matsusaka, J.G. (1995). Deviations from constituent interests: The role of legislative structure and political parties in the states. Economic Inquiry 33: 383-401.
11. Glazer, A., Grofman, B. and Robbins, M. (1987). Partisan and incumbency effects in the 1970s congressional redistricting. American Journal of Political Science 30: 680-701.
12. Gopoian, J.D. and West, D.M. (1984). Trading security for seats: Strategic considerations in the redistricting process. Journal of Politics 46: 1080-1096.
13. King, G. and Browning, R.X. (1987). Democratic responsiveness and partisan bias in congressional elections. American Political Science Review 81: 1251-1276.
14. Grofman, B. (1975). A review of macro-election systems. In R. Wildenmann (Ed.), German Political Yearbook, Vol. 4, 303-352. Munich.
15. Niemi, R.G. and Jackman, S. (1991). Bias and responsiveness in state legislative districting. Legislative Studies Quarterly 16: 183-202.
16. Niemi, R.G. and Winsky, L.R. (1992). The persistence of partisan redistricting effects in congressional elections in the 1970s and 1980s. Journal of Politics 54: 565-572.
17. Owen, G. and Grofman, B. (1988). Optimal partisan gerrymandering. Political Geography Quarterly 7: 5-22.
18. Ranney, A. (1976/1985). Parties in state politics. In H. Jacob and K.N. Vines (Eds.), Politics in the American states: Comparative analysis. Third edition. Boston: Little, Brown.
19. Scarrow, H.A. (1983). Parties, elections, and responsiveness in the State of New York. New York: New York University Press.
20. Taagepera, R. (1973). Seats and votes: A generalization of the cube law of elections. Social Science Research 2: 257-275.
21. Wright, G.C., Erikson, R.S. and McIver, J.P. (1985). Measuring state partisanship and ideology with survey data. Journal of Politics 47: 469-489.