The theory of human capital revisited: On the interaction of general and specific investments

Economic Journal

Volumn 116, Issue 514, 2006, Pages 903-923

  Kessler, Anke S ^a   Lülfesmann, Christoph ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HUMAN CAPITAL; LABOR MARKET; SOCIAL THEORY; TRAINING;

EID: 33751058169     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01116.x     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Acemoglu, D. (1997). 'Training and innovation in an imperfect labour market', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 64 (3) (July), pp. 445-64.
2. Acemoglu, D. and Pischke, J.-S. (1998). 'Why do firms train? Theory and evidence', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 113 (1) (February), pp. 79-119.
3. Acemoglu, D. and Pischke, J.-S. (1999). 'The structure of wages and investment in general training', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107 (3) (June), pp. 539-72.
4. Becker, G. (1964). Human Capital, New York: Columbia University Press.
5. Binmore, K. (1987). 'Perfect equilibria in bargaining models', in (K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, eds.), The Economics of Bargaining, pp. 77-105, Oxford: Blackwell.
6. Binmore, K., Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1989). 'An outside option experiment', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 104 (4) (November), pp. 753-70.
7. Bishop, J.H. (1991). 'On new hires', in (D. Stern and J.M. Ritzen, eds.), Market Failure in Training?, pp. 61-91, Berlin: Springer.
8. Blanchflower, D.G., Oswald, A.J. and Sanfey, P. (1996). 'Wages, profits, and rent-sharing', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 111 (1) (February), pp. 227-51.
9. Blinder, A.S. and Krueger, A.B. (1996). 'Labour turnover in the US and Japan: A tale of two countries', Pacific Economic Review, vol. 1, pp. 27-57.
10. Booth, A.L. and Chatterji, M. (1998). 'Unions and efficient training', Economic Journal, vol. 108 (447) (March), pp. 328-43.
11. Chang, C. and Wang, Y. (1995). 'A framework for understanding differences in labour turnover and human capital investment', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 28 (1) (September), pp. 91-105.
12. Chiang, S.-H. and Chiang, S.-C. (1990). 'General human capital as a shared investment under asymmetric information', Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 23 (1) (February), pp. 175-88.
13. Chiu, Y.S. and Yang, B.R. (1999). 'The outside option, threat point, and Nash bargaining solution', Economics Letters, vol. 62 (2) (February), pp. 181-8.
14. Edlin, A. and Reichelstein, S. (1996). 'Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment', American Economic Review, vol. 86 (3) (June), pp. 478-501.
15. Felli, L. and Harris, C. (1996). 'Learning, wage dynamics, and firm-specific human capital', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 104 (4) (August), pp. 838-68.
16. Felli, L. and Harris, C. (2004). 'Firm specific training', STICERD Discussion Paper No. TE/04/473, London School of Economics and Political Science.
17. Franz, W. and Soskice, D. (1995). 'The German apprenticeship system', in (F. Buttler et.al., eds.), Institutional Frameworks and Labour Market Performance. Comparative Views on the German and U.S. Economies, pp. 208-34, London: Routledge.
18. Gersbach, H. and Schmutzler, A. (2003). 'A product market theory of worker training', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3940, London.
19. Grossman, S.J. and Hart, O. (1986). 'The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94 (4) (August), pp. 691-719.
20. Grout, P.A. (1984). 'Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts', Econometrica, vol. 52 (2) (March), pp. 449-60.
21. Harhoff, D. and Kane, T.J. (1997). 'Is the German apprenticeship system a panacea for the U.S. labour market?', Journal of Population Economics, vol. 10 (2) (June), pp. 171-96.
22. Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990). 'Property rights and the nature of the firm', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98 (6) (December), pp. 1119-58.
23. Hashimoto, M. (1981). 'Firm-specific human capital as shared investment', American Economic Review, vol. 71 (3) (June), pp. 475-82.
24. Jovanovic, B. (1979). 'Job matching and the theory of turnover', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 87 (5) (October), pp. 972-90.
25. Kahn, L.M. and Murnighan, J.K. (1993). 'A general experiment on bargaining in demand games with outside options', American Economic Review, vol. 83 (5) (December), pp. 1260-80.
26. Katz, E. and Ziderman, A. (1990). 'Investment in general training: The role of information and labour mobility', Economic Journal, vol. 100 (403) (December), pp. 1147-58.
27. Kessler, A.S. and Lülfesmann, C. (2000). 'The theory of human capital revisited: On the interaction between general and specific investments'. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2533, London.
28. Knez, M.J. and Camerer, C.F. (1995). 'Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 10 (1) (June), pp. 65-94.
29. Loewenstein, M. and Spletzer, J.R. (1999). 'General and specific training: Evidence and implications', Journal of Human Resources, vol. 34 (4) (Fall), pp. 710-33.
30. MacLeod, B. and Malcomson, J. (1993 a). 'Investments, hold-up, and the form of market contracts', American Economic Review, vol. 83 (4) (September), pp. 811-37.
31. MacLeod, B. and Malcomson, J. (1993 b). 'Specific investments and wage profiles in labour markets', European Economic Review, vol. 37 (2-3) (April), pp. 343-54.
32. MacLeod, B. and Malcomson, J. (1995). 'Contract bargaining with symmetric information', Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 28 (2) (May), pp. 336-67.
33. Malcomson, J.M. (1997). 'Contracts, hold-up, and labour markets', Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 35 (4) (December), pp. 1916-57.
34. Malcomson, J.M., Maw, J.W. and McCormick, B. (2003). 'General training by firms, apprenticeship contracts, and public policy', European Economic Review, vol. 47 (2) (April), pp. 197-227.
35. Muthoo, A. (1999). Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36. Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R. and Sonnemans, J. (2004). 'Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle', European Economic Review, vol. 48 (6) (December), pp. 1399-410.
37. Osborne, M.J. and Rubinstein, A. (1990). Bargaining and Markets, San Diego: Academic Press.
38. Rosen, S. (1985). 'Implicit contracts: A survey', Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 23 (3) (September), pp. 1144-75.
39. Ryan, P. (1980). 'The costs of job training for a transferable skill', British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 18, pp. 334-52.
40. Scaramozzino, P. (1991). 'Bargaining with outside options: Wages and employment in UK manufacturing 1974-82', Economic Journal, vol. 101 (405) (March), pp. 331-42.
41. Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1984). 'Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model', Econometrica, vol. 52 (6) (November), pp. 1351-64.
42. Soskice, D. (1994). 'Reconciling markets and institutions: The German apprenticeship system', in (L.M. Lynch, ed.), Training and the Private Sector: International Comparisons, pp. 25-60, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
43. Stevens, M. (1994). 'A theoretical model of on-the-job training with imperfect competition', Oxford Exonomic Papers, vol. 46 (4) (October), pp. 537-62.
44. Topel, R.H. and Ward, M.P. (1992). 'Job mobility and the careers of young men', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107 (2) (May), pp. 439-79.
45. Von Bardeleben, R., Beicht, U. and Feher, K. (1995). Betriebliche Kosten und Nutzen der Ausbildung: Repräsentative Ergebnisse aus Industrie, Handel und Handwerk, Berichte zur beruflichen Bildung, Heft 187, Bielefeld: Bertelsmann.
46. Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: The Free Press.
47. Yu, K. (1999). 'Why do firms provide firm-sponsored education?', mimeo, UC Berkeley.