General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy

European Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 197-227

  Malcomson, James M ^a   Maw, James W ^b   McCormick, Barry ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b SWANSEA UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Apprenticeships; Contract enforceability; General training; Regulation

Indexed keywords

LABOR PRODUCTIVITY; PROFITABILITY; TRAINING; WAGE DETERMINATION;

EID: 0037376342     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00207-6     Document Type: Article

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