The outside option, threat point, and Nash bargaining solution

Economics Letters

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 181-188

  Chiu, Y Stephen ^a   Rachel Yang, B ^b  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

C72; C78; Nash bargaining; Outside option

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033478605     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00237-7     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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