Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines

Theoretical Computer Science

Volumn 369, Issue 1-3, 2006, Pages 157-168

  Angel, Eric ^a   Bampis, Evripidis ^a   Pascual, Fanny ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ D EVRY VAL D ESSONNE   (France)

Author keywords

Algorithmic game theory; Coordination mechanism; Mechanism design; Scheduling; Truthful algorithm

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTER SCIENCE; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SCHEDULING;

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY; COORDINATION MECHANISM; MECHANISM DESIGN; TRUTHFUL ALGORITHM;

PARALLEL PROCESSING SYSTEMS;

EID: 33750999951     PISSN: 03043975     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2006.07.057     Document Type: Article

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