Friends like these counterinsurgency and the war on terrorism

International Security

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 79-115

  Byman, Daniel L ^a,b,c  

^a Center for Peace and Security Studies   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c BROOKINGS INSTITUTION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750719380     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.79     Document Type: Review

References (170)

1. For a superb overview of the U.S. counterinsurgency program and its many problems, see Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1991).
2. Another valuable study of the U.S. problems in El Salvador with regard to reform is Andrew J. Bacevich, James D. Hallums, Richard H. White, and Thomas F. Young, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988).
3. Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance (New York: Free Press, 1977). This proved a particular problem for the United States in Vietnam where, as in Iraq today, the goal was to stand the Vietnamese up while U.S. forces stood down.
4. For a review, see Scott Sigmund Gartner, "Differing Evaluations of Vietnamization," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Autumn 1998), pp. 243-262.
5. U.S. Army, "Counterinsurgency Operations," FMI3-07.22 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Headquarters, 2004), section 2-16, notes that the United States seeks to improve host-nation security forces, but it does not discuss their common problems and weaknesses.
6. This article does not claim to systematically test these literatures. Rather, it selectively draws on their insights to shed light on the problems the United States faces when confronting insurgencies.
7. The forces examined include not only regular military forces but also those involved in fighting the insurgency, such as special police and intelligence units. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the regular army is excluded from many sensitive duties linked to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, with the Saudi Arabian National Guard playing the key role. The special security forces and the special emergency forces play particularly important roles in the effort against al-Qaida. See Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, "Saudi Internal Security: A Risk Assessment," Working Draft (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2004), p. 18.
8. In Algeria, initial failures led to the formation of elite COIN units that over time became quite large. Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998, trans. Jonathan Derrick (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 149. India has numerous forces involved in fighting insurgents in Kashmir, including the regular and special police, village defense committees, the central reserve police force, the Indian reserve police force, the central industrial security force, and the border security force.
9. For a review, see Thomas A. Marks, "At the Frontlines of the GWOT: State Response to Insurgency in Jammu," Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Fall 2003), pp. 38-46.
10. In many countries, the paramilitary forces are as large or larger than the regular army forces. In Uzbekistan, the paramilitary forces number approximately 20,000, and those in the regular army and air force account for another 55,000. Roger N. McDermott, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1992-2002: Threats, Influence, and Reform," Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2003), p. 29.
11. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin believe that factors that indicate a country is vulnerable to insurgency include poverty (which suggests states that are poor and bureaucratically weak), instability, inaccessible terrain, and a large population. See Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 75-90.
12. Central Intelligence Agency, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency" (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency), p. 2.
13. The pamphlet was published in the 1980s. For an alternative definition that emphasizes the importance of guerrilla war and the spirit of peasant rebellion, see Raj M. Desai and Harry Eckstein, "Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion," World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1990), p. 442.
14. Fearon and Laitin define "insurgency" as involving guerrilla warfare from rural base areas, whereas the U.S. Army definition emphasizes that "political power is the central issue in an insurgency." Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War";
15. and U.S. Army, "Counterinsurgency Operations," sec. 1-1.
16. See Daniel L. Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April/June 1998), pp. 149-169.
17. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, April 2006), pp. 183-228.
18. Thomas A. Marks, "India: State Response to Insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir - The Jammu Case," Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), p. 137.
19. See Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002), p. xviii. "Anonymous" was subsequently revealed as Michael Scheuer.
20. Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, Ibid., p. 207.
21. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 47-70;
22. and Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
23. The ability to recruit and replace lost cadre is vital for successful terrorist organizations. Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), pp. 34-36.
24. Somalia is excluded from this study because it lacks a true government. The United States, however, appears to have allied with local militias fighting those tied to jihadists. See Emily Wax and Karen De Young, "United States Secretly Backing Warlords in Somalia," Washington Post, May 17, 2006.
25. Bruce Hoffman notes that the United States repeatedly fails to detect the development of insurgencies until it is too late. Hoffman, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Occasional Paper OP-127-IPC/CMEPP (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, June 2004), pp. 1-4.
26. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2004), p. 18.
27. Using preliberation forces, however, would skew the data as well. For a superb review of the Iraqi military performance through the 1991 Gulf War, see Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 155-266.
28. National Security Council, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" (Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, November 2005), pp. 18-21, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130. pdf.
29. Thomas A. Marks, "Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism," Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 46-53.
30. Stephen T. Hosmer, Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflicts (New York: Crane Russak and Company, 1987), p. 128.
31. U.S. Army, "Counterinsurgency Operations," sec. 1-10.
32. Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan: On the Brink," New York Review of Books, June 22, 2006, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19098.
33. For a discussion on the nationalistic backlash that outside occupiers face, see David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 49-91;
34. and Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, Va.: Brassey's, 1990), p. 137.
35. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 125.
36. Some experts argue that this has happened already in Uzbekistan. See "Prepared Statement of Martha Brill Olcott,"
37. reprinted in "Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Instability," Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong., 1st sess., October 29, 2003, p. 57.
38. The literature on alliances among states is vast. Leading works include Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279;
39. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168;
40. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997);
41. and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
42. The similarity is far from exact: foreign governments are not "employees" of the United States, no matter how dependent they are on U.S. aid or financial support. Nor are the governments created bodies such as the European Commission, which other scholars have pointed to as an example of an agent that at times acts contrary to the interests of its principals. Mark Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 108.
43. Nevertheless, the problems are similar, making the comparison worthwhile. As Joseph Stiglitz contends, "The employer cannot travel on the road with his salesman to monitor precisely the effort he puts into his salesmanship. In each of these situations, the agent's ... action affects the principal." Stiglitz, "Principal and Agent" (ii), in Josh Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds., New York Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 3 (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 967.
44. For other important works on the principal-agent problem, see David. E.M. Sappington, "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 45-66.
45. See also Kenneth Arrow, "The Economics of Agency," in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985), pp. 37-51.
46. Principals can try to monitor their agents through a variety of measures, such as threatening to cut budgets or impose other sanctions and providing incentives to follow the principals' desires, but these in turn are costly and often imperfect. Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community," pp. 116-129.
47. See also Roderick Kiewiet and Matthew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 27.
48. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 37-45.
49. For a general overview of insurgency and counterinsurgency issues that pays particular attention to the problem of allies, see D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
50. Other excellent works are Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era;
51. George K. Tanham and Dennis J. Duncanson, "Some Dilemmas of Counterinsurgency," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1970), pp. 113-122;
52. William E. Odom, On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992);
53. Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press, 1964);
54. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham, 1970);
55. Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750 (New York: Routledge, 2003);
56. Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M. Taw, and David W. Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1991);
57. and Marks, "Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism."
58. For one useful list, see Central Intelligence Agency, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency," p. 13.
59. Most of these militaries also suffer similar problems in conventional military operations. The Saudis' lack of initiative in counterinsurgency, for example, is mirrored in their problems in conventional warfare. This article focuses on the characteristics useful for effective counterinsurgency, but many of these problems apply to overall military operations.
60. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 130;
61. and Central Intelligence Agency, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency," p. 10.
62. McDermott, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1990-2002," p. 32.
63. Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Sphinx and the Eagle," 1998, chap. 4.
64. See Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."
65. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 144;
66. and Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992), p. 9.
67. For a more complete overview of this problem, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996, pp. 564-566.
68. Emil P. Jurado, "Need for Coordinated Intelligence Network," Manila Standard, February 23, 2005;
69. and Fe.V. Maragay, "Safeguarding the Spy Fund," Manila Standard, January 31, 2005.
70. Pollack, "The Sphinx and the Eagle."
71. C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2004), p. 94.
72. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy," Asia Report, No. 90 (December 2004), p. 13.
73. Raymond A. Millen, Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2005), p. 3.
74. International Crisis Group, "The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet," Africa Report, No. 24 (October 2000), p. 12.
75. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy," p. 5.
76. Pollack, "The Sphinx and the Eagle."
77. Farkhad Tolipov and Roger N. McDermott, "Uzbekistan and the U.S.: Partners against Terrorism," Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Summer 2003), p. 2.
78. Charles DiLeonardo, "Training the Afghan National Army," Infantry, Vol. 94, No. 2 (March/ April 2005), p. 32.
79. Quoted in Tom Coghlan, "Toughing It Out in the Afghan Army," BBC News, June 15, 2005, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk.
80. Ahmed Rashid, "A Long, Hot Summer Ahead," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 19, 2001, p. 29.
81. Many Egyptian air force officers, for example, do not enjoy flying. Pollack, "The Sphinx and the Eagle."
82. Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 243.
83. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 131;
84. and Metz, and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 25.
85. John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), pp. 191-226.
86. McDermott, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1992-2002," p. 30.
87. Tolipov and McDermott, "Uzbekistan and the U.S.," p. 14.
88. Sunil Dasgupta, "Rise of Paramilitary Forces: Military Reorganization in Developing Societies," Working Draft (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2005), p. 23.
89. See Pollack, "The Sphinx and the Eagle."
90. Pollack, "The Sphinx and the Eagle." Ibid.
91. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 146;
92. and Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, p. v.
93. Lawrence E. Kline, "Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies: A Comparison," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn 1998), p. 127.
94. Lawrence E. Kline, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Ibid., p. 129.
95. See Transparency International, "The 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index," http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359. html.
96. McDermott, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1992-2002," p. 36.
97. Steven Rogers, "Beyond the Abu Sayyaf," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (January/February 2004), pp. 15-20.
98. International Crisis Group, "The Algerian Crisis," p. 12.
99. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform," Asia Report, No. 24 (October 2001), p. 13.
100. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes, p. 22.
101. DiLeonardo, "Training the Afghan National Army," p. 38.
102. Michael Willes, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 295;
103. Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998, p. 161;
104. and Kline, "Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies," p. 129.
105. Marks, "Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism," p. 52.
106. Christopher M. Ford, "Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency," Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 2005), p. 53.
107. T.E. Lawrence noted that the guerrillas needed only a limited amount of active support, but that much of the population must be passive or inactive backers. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, p. 20.
108. See also Central Intelligence Agency, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency," p. 8.
109. For an alternative view, see Chalmers Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 4 (July 1962), pp. 646-661.
110. For an assessment of how incentives affect the success of rebellions, see Mark I. Lichback, "What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action," World Politics, Vol. 46 No. 3 (April 1994), pp. 383-418;
111. and Jeffrey Berejikian, "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem," American Political Science. Review, Vol. 86, No. 3 (September 1992), pp. 647-657.
112. Rosen, Societies and Military Power, p. 241.
113. Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia, p. 90.
114. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform," p. 4.
115. Jim Nichol, Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated April 21, 2004), p. 6, Order Code RS21238.
116. Aleksius Jemadu, "Intelligence Agencies Must Be Held to Account," Jakarta Post, June 20, 2005.
117. See Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority.
118. These structural problems raise the interesting question of why the insurgencies have not won outright victories. The regimes' continued survival stems from several sources. First, the insurgents are often poorly led, brutal, and unpopular. Second, they face a much harder collective action problem. Because of the insurgent groups' smaller size, it is difficult to push uncommitted individuals to actively side with them. Third, not all of the regimes suffer from every problem identified here. Fourth, the insurgents' very structure makes eliminating them hard, but at the same time, this makes it difficult for them to mass forces to engage in mid-intensity combat. Thus there is often a stalemate or low-level strife, with neither side able to gain a decisive advantage.
119. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."
120. In such circumstances, the military becomes vital. As Morris Janowitz notes, "The absence of or the failure to develop more effective patterns of political and social control leads military regimes or military-based regimes to rely more heavily on internal police control." Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 7.
121. Freedom House, "Table of Independent Countries' Comparative Measures of Freedom," Freedom in the World, 2005, http://www.freedomhouse.org/ uploads/chart33File36.pdf.
122. Jim Nichol, Uzbekistan, p. 5.
123. A lack of democracy does not inherently make a regime illegitimate in the eyes of its people. The al-Saud royal family, for example, has long enjoyed legitimacy (though some argue this is fad ing) due to its provision of economic goods, conquest of rivals, and efforts to uphold the kingdom's religious credentials. For the purposes of this article, Saudi Arabia is coded as a legitimate regime, though it is a borderline case. See Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001);
124. and F. Gregory Gause III, "Be Careful What You Wish For: The Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations," World Policy Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 37-50.
125. McDermott, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1992-2002," pp. 36-37.
126. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1984), pp. 53-54, 225-226.
127. McDermott, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1992-2002," p. 36.
128. Willes, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, p. 245.
129. In none of the Arab countries surveyed by the Pew Foundation in July 2005 did a majority have a "favorable" view of the United States, though the poll did show an increase in U.S. popularity from past rock-bottom levels. See Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics," July 14, 2005, http://pewglobal.org/reports/ display.php?PageID=811.
130. Risa Brooks, "Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," in Nora Bensahel and Daniel Byman, eds., The Future Security Environment in the Middle East (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), pp. 129-162;
131. and James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 131-165.
132. In India, many state parties fear a strong army and oppose a heavy role for it, believing it would be used to weaken their autonomy at the local level. At the federal level, however, there was historically both disdain and suspicion from civilian leaders. Stephen Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001), p. 110;
133. and Rosen, Societies and Military Power, p. 208.
134. In the Philippines, corruption and politics both shape promotion. See "Yet Another Coup in the Philippines?" Jane's Foreign Report, June 23, 2005.
135. Brooks, "Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East."
136. For example, much of the Indonesian air force is not operational due to funding shortages. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform," p. 12.
137. McDermott, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1992-2002," p. 38.
138. Kline, "Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies," p. 127.
139. Rashid, "A Long, Hot Summer Ahead," p. 29.
140. Of course, if unemployment is high, skilled individuals may seek out the military simply because it offers gainful employment. In Iraq today, many Iraqis appear to be joining the security services for financial reasons despite the great personal risk it involves.
141. Pollack, "The Sphinx and the Eagle."
142. McDermott, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1992-2002," p. 32.
143. Mitch Frank, Brian Bennett, Anthony Davis, and Michael Ware, "Army on a Shoestring," Time Europe, August 26, 2002, pp. 30-36.
144. Rosen, Societies and Military Power, p. 209.
145. Alan Richards, "Economic Reform in the Middle East," in Bensahel and Byman, The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, pp. 107-117.
146. Rosen, Societies and Military Power, pp. 203-209.
147. For a broader look at the persistence of caste attitudes in India, see Myron Weiner, The Child and State in India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
148. Cohen, India, p. 114.
149. International Crisis Group, "The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan," Asia Report, No. 95 (April 2005), p. i.
150. Rosen, Societies and Military Power, p. 212.
151. The United States has taken steps to offset the dominance of Tajiks in the Afghan military by recruiting more Pashtuns for a range of positions. Joshua Kucera, "Afghanistan Looks to Army Expansion," Jane's Defence Weekly, October 13, 2004;
152. and Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-war Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 19, 2005), p. 30, Order Code RL30588.
153. As Mark Pollack argues, information that an agent is not following the wishes of the principal is useful only if the principal can threaten the agent with sanctions. Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community," p. 116.
154. Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 22-23.
155. See also Douglas MacDonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
156. D. Michael Shafer, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency, " Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 64.
157. See Alan J. Kuperman, "Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention," in Timothy W. Crawford and Kuperman, eds., Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion, and Civil War (New York: Routledge, 2006). The economic analogies, including the International Monetary Fund, appear in ibid., pp. 12-16.
158. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 19.
159. Members of the General Directorate for External Security, interviewed by the author, Paris, France, May 2005.
160. Richard Weitz, "Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?" Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 6 (November/December 2004), pp. 465-490.
161. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 19.
162. "Prepared Statement of Fiona Hill,"
163. reprinted in "Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Instability."
164. "Prepared Statement of Stephen Blank,"
165. reprinted in "Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Instability," p. 53.
166. Pollack identifies a similar general problem in principal-agent relationships. Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community," p. 117.
167. Quoted in Weitz, "Storm Clouds over Central Asia," p. 519.
168. Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998, p. 232.
169. See Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community," p. 111.
170. Thom Shanker and C.J. Chivers, "Crackdown in Uzbekistan Reopens Longstanding Debate on U.S. Military Aid," New York Times, July 13, 2005.