Differing evaluations of Vietnamization

Journal of Interdisciplinary History

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 243-262

  Gartner, Scott Sigmund ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0342942468     PISSN: 00221953     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002219598551698     Document Type: Review

References (70)

1. For a discussion of war outcomes, see Allan Stam, Win Lose or Draw (Ann Arbor, 1996);
2. Gartner and Randolph M. Siverson, "War Expansion and War Outcome," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XL (1996), 4-15. About battlefield effectiveness,
3. see Dan Reiter and Stam, "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," " Journal of Conflict Resolution, ibid., XLII (1998), 259-277.
4. For an example of the impact of duration, see Scott Bennett and Stam, "The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985," American Political Science Review, XC (1996), 239-257.
5. For studies of war expansion, see Patrick Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third Party Intervention in Interstate Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XL (1996), 336-359;
6. Alastair Smith, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision," " Journal of Conflict Resolution, ibid., XL (1996), 4-15.
7. For examples of studies about the impact of strategy, see Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven, 1997);
8. Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, World Wars and Alliances (Ithaca, 1996).
9. For studies analyzing the nexus of domestic politics and war, see Gartner and Gary M. Segura, "War, Casualties, and Public Opinion," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XLII (1998), 278-300;
10. idem and Michael Wilkening, "All Politics Are Local: Local Losses and Individual Attitudes Towards the Vietnam War," " Journal of Conflict Resolution, ibid., XLI (1997), 669-694;
11. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," American Political Science Review, LXXXIX (1995), 841-855;
12. and Siverson, idem and Gary Woller, "War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis," " American Political Science Review, ibid., LXXXVI (1992), 638-646.
13. Russell J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1916-1980: Realism Versus Reciprocity (Cambridge 1993), 25.
14. Studies that note the importance of quantitative indicators for those who made decisions concerning the Vietnam War include Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969) (New York, 1971);
15. Guenther Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, 1978);
16. Thomas C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Boulder, 1985);
17. James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, 1991);
18. Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change (Ithaca, 1994);
19. Gartner, Strategic Assessment.
20. Philip Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975 (New York, 1988), 660;
21. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Wayne, N.J., 1977), 144, 145.
22. The War Managers (Ibid., 146;
23. George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam: 1950-1975 (New York, 1979), 226.
24. Kinnard, War Managers, 148;
25. George D. Moss, Vietnam: An American Ordeal (Englewood Cliffs, 1990), 331;
26. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York, 1991), 657.
27. Karnow also notes that Melvin Laird "had a vested interest in seeing Vietnamization work" and that Nixon was "privately glum" about the situation. Robert Pape suggests that it was the interaction between us airpower and the North Vietnamese Army strategy that lead to the United States' success in Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War (Ithaca, 1996).
28. Tom Wells, The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam (New York, 1994);
29. James William Gibson, The Perfect War: Techno-War in Vietnam (Boston, 1986);
30. Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War, Vietnam: 1945-1974 (New York, 1981);
31. Timothy J. Lomperis, The War Everyone Lost - and Won (Washington, D.C., 1984);
32. Moss, Vietnam, 307, 337;
33. Davidson, Vietnam at War, 660.
34. Vietnam at War, Ibid., 601;
35. Wells, War Within.
36. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964), 387;
37. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Use of Force (Lanham, 1988), 100;
38. Herring, America's Longest War, 250;
39. John Mueller, "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam: The Statistics of a Deadly Quarrel," in Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, and Richard J. Stoll (eds.), Choices in World Politics: Sovereignty and Independence (New York, 1989), 88. Popular works on Vietnam include a great deal of discussion about the role of race.
40. See for example, Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York, 1996).
41. Jeffrey T. Richelson (project director), Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (Washington D.C., 1994), 284;
42. Kinnard, War Managers.
43. Mueller, War Presidents and Public Opinion (New York, 1973);
44. Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening, "All Politics Are Local"; Gartner and Segura, "War, Casualties and Public Opinion."
45. Nguyen Duy Hinh, Vietnamization and the Cease-fire (Washington, D.C., 1980).
46. Avant, Political Institutions;
47. Gartner and Melissa Edson Myers, "Body Counts and 'Success' in the Vietnam and Korean Wars," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXV (1995), 377-395;
48. Thayer, War Without Fronts;
49. Samuel Lipsman and Edward Doyle, The Vietnam Experience: Fighting for Time (Boston, 1983), 50;
50. Hinh, Vietnamization.
51. Vietnamization.Ibid., 64.
52. Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff (eds.), The Air War in Indochina (Boston, 1972), 267-272.
53. All analyses were conducted in the statistical program, Stata. Tests are two-tailed.
54. The United States' Southeast Asia Casualties file contains casualties from 1957 (advisors) to 1990. After 1973, additions include those initially believed to be missing in action and later determined to be dead. Analysis of the entire period would not be appropriate since this study concentrates on decision making between 1965 and 1973.
55. The closer the Durbin-Watson coefficient in Model 2 is to 2.0, the less evident are auto-correlation problems. See A. H. Studenmund, Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide (New York, 1992). The Durbin-Watson statistic for Model 2 (using a Cochrane-Orcutt technique) is 1.97, suggesting that auto-correlation is not a problem. The Durbin-Watson statistic on Model 2 run without the Cochrane-Orcutt technique is 1.05, strongly suggesting the presence of serial auto-correlation (results not shown). All of the equations exclude the presentation of error terms.
56. See Robert J. Friedrich, "In Defense of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations," American Journal of Political Science, XXVI (1982), 797-833, for a discussion of interactive terms in multiplicative models.
57. Run by itself in a bivariate regression with US-KIA, US-TROOP explains only .02 percent of the variance of Americans killed in action. No other seasonal effects were found to have systematic effect on US-KIA. Results not shown.
58. RHO is the serial component of the error term.
59. Gartner and Myers, "Body Counts"; Mueller, "Search"; Robert S. McNamara, with Brian Van De Mark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995),
60. 237; Samuel Adams, War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir (South Royalton, Vt., 1994), 76.
61. Kinnard, War Managers; Thayer, War Without Fronts, 30.
62. Bueno de Mesquita, "Counterfactuals and International Affairs: Some Insights from Game Theory," in Phillip E. Tedock and Aaron Belkin (eds.), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton, 1996), 211-229;
63. Barry Weingast, "Off-the-Path Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Counterfactuals and Its Implications for Political and Historical Analysis,Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (" ibid., 230-246;
64. James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politics, XLIII (1991), 169-195;
65. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London, 1995).
66. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York, 1991);
67. James Blackwell Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War (New York, 1991);
68. Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York, 1995).
69. For a contrasting view of this uniqueness, see Gartner and Myers, "Body Counts"; Bueno de Mesquita, "Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony," World Politics, XLIII (1991), 28-52;
70. Stephen P. Nicholson and Ross A. Miller, "Prior Beliefs and Voter Turnout in the 1986 and 1988 Congressional Elections," Political Research Quarterly, L (1997), 199-213; Bueno de Mesquita, "Counterfactuals."