Occupational hazards: Why military occupations succeed or fail

International Security

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 49-91

  Edelstein, David M ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 4544334889     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/0162288041762913     Document Type: Review

References (164)

1. Hearing of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2003.
2. Rumsfeld quote from "Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability with Afghan President Hamid Karzai," February 27, 2003, http://www.defenselink. mil/transcripts/2003/t02272003_t0227ap .html.
3. Wolfowitz quote from "Prepared Statement for the House Budget Committee on the FY 2004 Defense Budget Request," 108th Cong., 1st sess., February 27, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030227- depsecdef0044.html.
4. On the occupation of Iraq, see Conrad C. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003); and Julie Kosterlitz, "Occupational Hazards," National Journal, Vol. 35, No. 12 (March 2003), pp. 910-915.
5. On the occupation of Iraq, see Conrad C. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003); and Julie Kosterlitz, "Occupational Hazards," National Journal, Vol. 35, No. 12 (March 2003), pp. 910-915.
6. For one exception, see Eric Carlton, Occupation: The Policies and Practices of Military Conquerors (New York: Routledge, 1992).
7. Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, Lessons from the Past: The American Record of Nation Building (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
8. For a warning against drawing the wrong lessons from the post-World War II Germany case, see Douglas Porch, "Occupational Hazards," National Interest, No. 72 (Summer 2003), pp. 35-47.
9. James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Schwanger, and Anga Timilsina, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003).
10. This definition is similar to international legal scholar Eyal Benvenisti's definition of occupation as "the effective control of a power ... over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory." Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 4.
11. An occupying power need not occupy an entire country. Certain occupations, such as the Allied occupation of Istanbul after World War I, have involved the occupation of only a city or region.
12. There is a sizable international law literature on occupation. Aside from Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, see Nisuke Ando, Surrender, Occupation, and Private Property in International Law: An Evaluation of U.S. Practice in Japan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Doris Appel Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949); David B. Jr. Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram, "Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 87-103; and Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).
13. There is a sizable international law literature on occupation. Aside from Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, see Nisuke Ando, Surrender, Occupation, and Private Property in International Law: An Evaluation of U.S. Practice in Japan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Doris Appel Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949); David B. Jr. Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram, "Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 87-103; and Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).
14. There is a sizable international law literature on occupation. Aside from Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, see Nisuke Ando, Surrender, Occupation, and Private Property in International Law: An Evaluation of U.S. Practice in Japan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Doris Appel Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949); David B. Jr. Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram, "Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 87-103; and Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).
15. There is a sizable international law literature on occupation. Aside from Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, see Nisuke Ando, Surrender, Occupation, and Private Property in International Law: An Evaluation of U.S. Practice in Japan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Doris Appel Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949); David B. Jr. Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram, "Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 87-103; and Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).
16. There is a sizable international law literature on occupation. Aside from Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, see Nisuke Ando, Surrender, Occupation, and Private Property in International Law: An Evaluation of U.S. Practice in Japan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Doris Appel Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949); David B. Jr. Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram, "Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 87-103; and Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).
17. On wartime occupation, see Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). On the German occupation of France during World War II, see Ian Ousby, Occupation: The Ordeal of France, 1940-1944 (New York: St. Martin's, 1998).
18. On wartime occupation, see Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). On the German occupation of France during World War II, see Ian Ousby, Occupation: The Ordeal of France, 1940-1944 (New York: St. Martin's, 1998).
19. The two other types of occupations are collateral occupations and caretaker occupations. Collateral occupations hold foreign territory until some indemnity is repaid. For example, following the Franco-Prussian War, 50,000 German troops occupied six departments of France until the French paid 1.5 billion francs in war reparations. Caretaker occupations are designed to hold a territory until a long-term settlement of the status of the territory is devised. The British occupations of Cyrenaica, Eritrea, Somalia, and Tripolotania after World War II are examples of caretaker occupations. I exclude these two types from this study because they are qualitatively different from either security or comprehensive occupations. For a more detailed typology that delineates seventeen different forms of occupation, see Adam Roberts, "What Is a Military Occupation?" British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 55, (1984), pp. 249-305.
20. Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944); The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 58; Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 23; and U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), which compares the limited goals of the Rhineland occupation to the more ambitious goals of the Cuban and Filipino occupations (p. 268).
21. Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944); The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 58; Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 23; and U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), which compares the limited goals of the Rhineland occupation to the more ambitious goals of the Cuban and Filipino occupations (p. 268).
22. Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944); The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 58; Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 23; and U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), which compares the limited goals of the Rhineland occupation to the more ambitious goals of the Cuban and Filipino occupations (p. 268).
23. Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944); The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 58; Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 23; and U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), which compares the limited goals of the Rhineland occupation to the more ambitious goals of the Cuban and Filipino occupations (p. 268).
24. In the initial aftermath of World War II, the inclination was to limit the industrial power of both Japan and Germany. Once the Cold War had begun, the United States reversed its position and encouraged industrialization. On the Cold War impetus to rebuild the Japanese economy, see John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), pp. 525-546. On U.S. policy toward postwar Germany, see Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 385-386; and Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
25. In the initial aftermath of World War II, the inclination was to limit the industrial power of both Japan and Germany. Once the Cold War had begun, the United States reversed its position and encouraged industrialization. On the Cold War impetus to rebuild the Japanese economy, see John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), pp. 525-546. On U.S. policy toward postwar Germany, see Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 385-386; and Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
26. In the initial aftermath of World War II, the inclination was to limit the industrial power of both Japan and Germany. Once the Cold War had begun, the United States reversed its position and encouraged industrialization. On the Cold War impetus to rebuild the Japanese economy, see John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), pp. 525-546. On U.S. policy toward postwar Germany, see Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 385-386; and Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
27. In the initial aftermath of World War II, the inclination was to limit the industrial power of both Japan and Germany. Once the Cold War had begun, the United States reversed its position and encouraged industrialization. On the Cold War impetus to rebuild the Japanese economy, see John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), pp. 525-546. On U.S. policy toward postwar Germany, see Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 385-386; and Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
28. In both of these occupations, a primary concern was preventing Germany and Japan from reemerging as threats to their regions. On Germany, see John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 150-151. On Japan, see Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy (New York: Continuum, 2002), p. 203. Ultimately, the Japanese constitution included the famous article 9, which strictly limits the purposes for which Japan can have a military.
29. In both of these occupations, a primary concern was preventing Germany and Japan from reemerging as threats to their regions. On Germany, see John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 150-151. On Japan, see Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy (New York: Continuum, 2002), p. 203. Ultimately, the Japanese constitution included the famous article 9, which strictly limits the purposes for which Japan can have a military.
30. The Correlates of War data set is available online at http://cow2.1a.psu.edu.
31. As always, there are some borderline cases. For example, I include the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, though the presence of the United States in the Philippines might be considered colonialism by some. U.S. leaders intensely debated whether or not to annex the Philippines after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Following the conflict with Filipino insurgents shortly after the occupation began, the United States became increasingly reluctant to stay in the Philippines. By 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt observed, "The Philippine Islands form our heel of Achilles." Quoted in E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970). On the other hand, I have excluded the French mandates in Syria and Lebanon immediately after World War I. In these cases, the evidence suggests that the French viewed their presence in the Middle East as more permanent than temporary. Summarizing the League of Nations mandates in the Middle East, David Fromkin concludes, "But France, in particular, regarded the pledge of independence as window-dressing, and approached Syria and Lebanon in an annexationist spirit." Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), p. 411. I also have excluded the cases of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II. In these cases, the Soviet Union retained a considerable amount of control over the states of the Warsaw Pact throughout the Cold War. If one were to code these cases as occupations, it would be difficult to identify when, aside from 1989, these occupations ended.
32. As always, there are some borderline cases. For example, I include the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, though the presence of the United States in the Philippines might be considered colonialism by some. U.S. leaders intensely debated whether or not to annex the Philippines after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Following the conflict with Filipino insurgents shortly after the occupation began, the United States became increasingly reluctant to stay in the Philippines. By 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt observed, "The Philippine Islands form our heel of Achilles." Quoted in E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970). On the other hand, I have excluded the French mandates in Syria and Lebanon immediately after World War I. In these cases, the evidence suggests that the French viewed their presence in the Middle East as more permanent than temporary. Summarizing the League of Nations mandates in the Middle East, David Fromkin concludes, "But France, in particular, regarded the pledge of independence as window-dressing, and approached Syria and Lebanon in an annexationist spirit." Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), p. 411. I also have excluded the cases of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II. In these cases, the Soviet Union retained a considerable amount of control over the states of the Warsaw Pact throughout the Cold War. If one were to code these cases as occupations, it would be difficult to identify when, aside from 1989, these occupations ended.
33. For a discussion of the difficulty of assessing the success or failure of any particular policy, see David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 115-134. See also Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 33-37.
34. For a discussion of the difficulty of assessing the success or failure of any particular policy, see David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 115-134. See also Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 33-37.
35. On the initial role of the Philippines in the emerging Japanese-American rivalry leading up to World War II, see Walter LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 60-62.
36. For more detail on the coding of each case, see the appendix on the author's website at: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/dme7.
37. Measuring the troops involved in an occupation is difficult. The number of troops tends to shift, sometimes dramatically, through the course of an occupation. In addition, troop levels are a direct cost; simple measures of indirect costs are impossible.
38. While inherently subjective, these codings are, I believe, fairly robust. That is, disagreements on a few of the marginal cases would not substantially change the conclusions of this study.
39. The four ongoing cases in Table 1-Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq-are not included in the twenty-four.
40. The Soviet Union did little to endear itself to the populations of territory it occupied after World War II. On Germany, see Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). On northern Korea, see Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); and Erik Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (New York: Berg, 1989).
41. The Soviet Union did little to endear itself to the populations of territory it occupied after World War II. On Germany, see Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). On northern Korea, see Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); and Erik Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (New York: Berg, 1989).
42. The Soviet Union did little to endear itself to the populations of territory it occupied after World War II. On Germany, see Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). On northern Korea, see Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); and Erik Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (New York: Berg, 1989).
43. On denazification in Germany, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, pp. 101-110; and Elmer Plischke, "Denazification in Germany: A Policy Analysis," in Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans As Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 198-225. On defascistization in Italy, see C.R.S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), pp. 59-73.
44. On denazification in Germany, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, pp. 101-110; and Elmer Plischke, "Denazification in Germany: A Policy Analysis," in Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans As Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 198-225. On defascistization in Italy, see C.R.S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), pp. 59-73.
45. On denazification in Germany, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, pp. 101-110; and Elmer Plischke, "Denazification in Germany: A Policy Analysis," in Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans As Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 198-225. On defascistization in Italy, see C.R.S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), pp. 59-73.
46. On the complete devastation of Japan, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 33-64. On the desire of Koreans for independence, not further occupation, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 267-381.
47. On the complete devastation of Japan, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 33-64. On the desire of Koreans for independence, not further occupation, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 267-381.
48. U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, pp. 18-19.
49. Nelson, Victors Divided, pp. 33-34.
50. On the role of the emperor in postwar Japan, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 278-301. On the emperor's place in the new Japanese constitution, see Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 281-284.
51. On the role of the emperor in postwar Japan, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 278-301. On the emperor's place in the new Japanese constitution, see Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 281-284.
52. Japan, for example, paid twice as much in occupation costs as it received in foreign aid from the United States. See Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 37. West Germans contributed to their rebuilding after World War II through the "first charge principle," which mandated that German capital be used to pay for reconstruction costs before reparations. See Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 89.
53. Japan, for example, paid twice as much in occupation costs as it received in foreign aid from the United States. See Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 37. West Germans contributed to their rebuilding after World War II through the "first charge principle," which mandated that German capital be used to pay for reconstruction costs before reparations. See Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 89.
54. For Great Britain, control over Egypt was essential for protecting trade routes to India. See Afaf Lufti Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 144; and Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent (New York: St. Martin's, 1961), p. 103.
55. For Great Britain, control over Egypt was essential for protecting trade routes to India. See Afaf Lufti Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 144; and Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent (New York: St. Martin's, 1961), p. 103.
56. On the prominence of interests over ideals in the post-World War II Germany case, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, p. 243. On the "reverse course" to counter the perceived Soviet threat to Japan, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 525-526; and Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 457-515.
57. On the prominence of interests over ideals in the post-World War II Germany case, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, p. 243. On the "reverse course" to counter the perceived Soviet threat to Japan, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 525-526; and Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 457-515.
58. On the prominence of interests over ideals in the post-World War II Germany case, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, p. 243. On the "reverse course" to counter the perceived Soviet threat to Japan, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 525-526; and Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 457-515.
59. On Haiti, see Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti I," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 1927), pp. 228-258; Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti II," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 1927), pp. 368-396; Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars (New York: Macmillan, 1990); and Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995 [1971]).
60. On Haiti, see Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti I," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 1927), pp. 228-258; Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti II," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 1927), pp. 368-396; Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars (New York: Macmillan, 1990); and Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995 [1971]).
61. On Haiti, see Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti I," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 1927), pp. 228-258; Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti II," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 1927), pp. 368-396; Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars (New York: Macmillan, 1990); and Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995 [1971]).
62. On Haiti, see Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti I," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 1927), pp. 228-258; Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti II," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 1927), pp. 368-396; Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars (New York: Macmillan, 1990); and Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995 [1971]).
63. John J. McCloy, "From Military Government to Self-Government," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 114-123, at p. 122.
64. Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 52-53. In fact, Yoshida's gratitude may have been unwarranted. The historical evidence suggests that Joseph Stalin had abandoned Japan to the United States and was focusing his efforts on controlling Central and Eastern Europe. See John Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New York: New Press, 1993), pp. 163-164.
65. Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 52-53. In fact, Yoshida's gratitude may have been unwarranted. The historical evidence suggests that Joseph Stalin had abandoned Japan to the United States and was focusing his efforts on controlling Central and Eastern Europe. See John Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New York: New Press, 1993), pp. 163-164.
66. On the problems of reconstructing Bosnia, including the continuing loyalty of Bosnians to ethnic nationalist political parties, see International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles," Brussels/Sarajevo, December 18, 2000; Eric Jansson, "Bosnia Elections Bring Close Result," Financial Times, October 7, 2002, p. 8; Daniel N. Nelson, "To Make Peace in a Year, IFOR Must Do More," Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1996, p. 18; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 101-137.
67. On the problems of reconstructing Bosnia, including the continuing loyalty of Bosnians to ethnic nationalist political parties, see International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles," Brussels/Sarajevo, December 18, 2000; Eric Jansson, "Bosnia Elections Bring Close Result," Financial Times, October 7, 2002, p. 8; Daniel N. Nelson, "To Make Peace in a Year, IFOR Must Do More," Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1996, p. 18; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 101-137.
68. On the problems of reconstructing Bosnia, including the continuing loyalty of Bosnians to ethnic nationalist political parties, see International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles," Brussels/Sarajevo, December 18, 2000; Eric Jansson, "Bosnia Elections Bring Close Result," Financial Times, October 7, 2002, p. 8; Daniel N. Nelson, "To Make Peace in a Year, IFOR Must Do More," Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1996, p. 18; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 101-137.
69. On the problems of reconstructing Bosnia, including the continuing loyalty of Bosnians to ethnic nationalist political parties, see International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles," Brussels/Sarajevo, December 18, 2000; Eric Jansson, "Bosnia Elections Bring Close Result," Financial Times, October 7, 2002, p. 8; Daniel N. Nelson, "To Make Peace in a Year, IFOR Must Do More," Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1996, p. 18; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 101-137.
70. On the symbiotic relationship between Rhee and his American benefactors, see Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1, p. 431.
71. On divisions within the Korean polity, see the essays in Bonnie B.C. Oh, ed., Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002). In particular, in that volume, see Oh, "Kim Kyu-sik and the Coalition Effort," pp. 103-122.
72. On divisions within the Korean polity, see the essays in Bonnie B.C. Oh, ed., Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002). In particular, in that volume, see Oh, "Kim Kyu-sik and the Coalition Effort," pp. 103-122.
73. I code the South Korea case as having a commonly perceived external threat because many political leaders shared the U.S. assessment of the communist threat, but the occupation only partially succeeded because of popular resistance to it. Only after the Korean War was the U.S.-South Korean alliance cemented.
74. Precisely defining "timely" is unfortunately impossible. How anxious an occupied population is to see an occupying power depart varies from case to case.
75. See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 70-85; and Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 56-67.
76. See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 70-85; and Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 56-67.
77. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," p. 114.
78. Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 27. See also Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 27-28. The United States did exclude approximately 200,000 Japanese from public office. See Hans H. Baerwald, "The Purge in Occupied Japan," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 188-197.
79. Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 27. See also Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 27-28. The United States did exclude approximately 200,000 Japanese from public office. See Hans H. Baerwald, "The Purge in Occupied Japan," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 188-197.
80. Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 27. See also Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 27-28. The United States did exclude approximately 200,000 Japanese from public office. See Hans H. Baerwald, "The Purge in Occupied Japan," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 188-197.
81. It is worth noting, though, that the process of denazification was abandoned by 1949, when the emergence of the Cold War and the urgency to rebuild Germany dictated that denazification was no longer feasible. See Norbert Frei, Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past, trans. Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
82. Sir Evelyn Baring to George Levenson-Gower, second earl of Granville, May 20, 1885. Quoted in R.C. Mowat, "From Liberalism to Imperialism: The Case of Egypt, 1875-1887," Historical Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1973), p. 120.
83. The illegitimacy of elections held in Haiti was clear even to Marine Col. Smedley Butler, one of the high-ranking U.S. officers administering the U.S. occupation. Describing marine-sponsored elections in June 1918, Butler observed, "The opposition candidates were declared bandits when it became necessary to elect our man to office. Our candidates always win. In one election nobody liked the fellow ... the district was canvassed, and 400 were found who would vote for the proper candidate. Notice of the opening of the polls was given five minutes beforehand, the 400 voters were assembled in a line and when they had voted, in about two hours, the polls were closed." Butler, quoted in "The Hate of Haiti," Literary Digest, December 21, 1929, pp. 6-7. Quoted in Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, p. 99.
84. The illegitimacy of elections held in Haiti was clear even to Marine Col. Smedley Butler, one of the high-ranking U.S. officers administering the U.S. occupation. Describing marine-sponsored elections in June 1918, Butler observed, "The opposition candidates were declared bandits when it became necessary to elect our man to office. Our candidates always win. In one election nobody liked the fellow ... the district was canvassed, and 400 were found who would vote for the proper candidate. Notice of the opening of the polls was given five minutes beforehand, the 400 voters were assembled in a line and when they had voted, in about two hours, the polls were closed." Butler, quoted in "The Hate of Haiti," Literary Digest, December 21, 1929, pp. 6-7. Quoted in Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, p. 99.
85. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945, p. 75.
86. "Multilateral" occupations have the participation of more than one occupying power and/or the imprimatur of a multilateral organization, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations.
87. On legitimacy more generally in international politics, see Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, The Legitimacy of International Organizations (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); Martha Firmemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Geir Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
88. On legitimacy more generally in international politics, see Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, The Legitimacy of International Organizations (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); Martha Firmemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Geir Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
89. On legitimacy more generally in international politics, see Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, The Legitimacy of International Organizations (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); Martha Firmemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Geir Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
90. On legitimacy more generally in international politics, see Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, The Legitimacy of International Organizations (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); Martha Firmemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Geir Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
91. On legitimacy more generally in international politics, see Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, The Legitimacy of International Organizations (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); Martha Firmemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Geir Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
92. On legitimacy more generally in international politics, see Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, The Legitimacy of International Organizations (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); Martha Firmemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Geir Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
93. See John W. Dower, "A Warning from History: Don't Expect Democracy in Iraq," Boston Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (February 2003-March 2003), http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.1/dower.html.
94. On Blair, see Richard W. Stevenson, "Bush Sees Aid Role of U.N. as Limited in Rebuilding Iraq," New York Times, April 9, 2003, sec. A, p. 1. On de Villepin, see Steven R. Weisman, "Powell and Europeans See U.N. Role in Postwar Iraq," New York Times, April 4, 2003, sec. B, p. 8; and Colum Lynch, "France, Russia Back Lifting of Iraq Sanctions," Washington Post, May 22, 2003, sec. A, p. 1.
95. On Blair, see Richard W. Stevenson, "Bush Sees Aid Role of U.N. as Limited in Rebuilding Iraq," New York Times, April 9, 2003, sec. A, p. 1. On de Villepin, see Steven R. Weisman, "Powell and Europeans See U.N. Role in Postwar Iraq," New York Times, April 4, 2003, sec. B, p. 8; and Colum Lynch, "France, Russia Back Lifting of Iraq Sanctions," Washington Post, May 22, 2003, sec. A, p. 1.
96. On Blair, see Richard W. Stevenson, "Bush Sees Aid Role of U.N. as Limited in Rebuilding Iraq," New York Times, April 9, 2003, sec. A, p. 1. On de Villepin, see Steven R. Weisman, "Powell and Europeans See U.N. Role in Postwar Iraq," New York Times, April 4, 2003, sec. B, p. 8; and Colum Lynch, "France, Russia Back Lifting of Iraq Sanctions," Washington Post, May 22, 2003, sec. A, p. 1.
97. Quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "Policy Lobotomy Needed," New York Times, August 31, 2003, sec. 4, p. 9.
98. Quoted in Steven R. Weisman, "Powell Sees Major Role for U.N. in Postwar Iraq," New York Times, March 28, 2003, sec. B, p. 10. See also Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Chuck Hagel, "Winning the Peace," Washington Post, April 6, 2003, sec. B, p. 7.
99. Quoted in Steven R. Weisman, "Powell Sees Major Role for U.N. in Postwar Iraq," New York Times, March 28, 2003, sec. B, p. 10. See also Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Chuck Hagel, "Winning the Peace," Washington Post, April 6, 2003, sec. B, p. 7.
100. In earlier writing, Dower himself raises questions about how legitimate other countries thought the U.S. occupation of Japan was. Militarism was the key concern of Japan's neighbors, and the U.S. policy of remilitarization raised concerns throughout Asia. U.S. economic policies in Japan caused great concern in London. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, p. 160. On British misgivings about the occupation, see also Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 100, 135-136.
101. In earlier writing, Dower himself raises questions about how legitimate other countries thought the U.S. occupation of Japan was. Militarism was the key concern of Japan's neighbors, and the U.S. policy of remilitarization raised concerns throughout Asia. U.S. economic policies in Japan caused great concern in London. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, p. 160. On British misgivings about the occupation, see also Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 100, 135-136.
102. McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924, p. 38.
103. For an argument critical of multilateral occupation in Iraq, see Rachel Belton, "Rebuilding Iraq: No Job for a Coalition," Washington Post, April 28, 2003, sec. A, p. 23.
104. On the effect of multilateralism on the occupation of the Rhineland, see McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924, p. 83.
105. On the occupation of the Rhineland, see ibid.; Nelson, Victors Divided; U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920; and David G. Williamson, The British in Germany, 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (New York: Berg, 1991).
106. On the occupation of the Rhineland, see ibid.; Nelson, Victors Divided; U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920; and David G. Williamson, The British in Germany, 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (New York: Berg, 1991).
107. On the occupation of the Rhineland, see ibid.; Nelson, Victors Divided; U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920; and David G. Williamson, The British in Germany, 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (New York: Berg, 1991).
108. On the occupation of the Rhineland, see ibid.; Nelson, Victors Divided; U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920; and David G. Williamson, The British in Germany, 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (New York: Berg, 1991).
109. The original agreement reached in 1919 called for a fifteen-year occupation of the Rhineland. American participation in the occupation ended in 1923; British participation ended at the close of 1929; and the last French troops withdrew in June 1930. For a discussion of the politics surrounding the end of the Rhineland occupation, see Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).
110. On the difficulties that multilateralism caused in the occupation of Germany after World War II, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, pp. 12-13. On the occupation of Istanbul, see N.B. Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923 (Boston: Brill, 1999). On the difficulties that multilateralism is posing in Afghanistan, see Ray Salvatore Jennings, "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq," Peaceworks, No. 49 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003), p. 21.
111. On the difficulties that multilateralism caused in the occupation of Germany after World War II, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, pp. 12-13. On the occupation of Istanbul, see N.B. Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923 (Boston: Brill, 1999). On the difficulties that multilateralism is posing in Afghanistan, see Ray Salvatore Jennings, "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq," Peaceworks, No. 49 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003), p. 21.
112. On the difficulties that multilateralism caused in the occupation of Germany after World War II, see Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, pp. 12-13. On the occupation of Istanbul, see N.B. Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923 (Boston: Brill, 1999). On the difficulties that multilateralism is posing in Afghanistan, see Ray Salvatore Jennings, "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq," Peaceworks, No. 49 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003), p. 21.
113. Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 69-70.
114. On the "reverse course," see Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 468-485.
115. On the disillusionment of the Japanese people with the "reverse course," see Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 525-526.
116. Bonnie B.C. Oh, "Introduction," in Oh, Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948, pp. 1-11, at p. 9.
117. James I. Matray, "Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948," Korean Studies, Vol. 19 (1995), p. 21.
118. See Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 525; and Marlene J. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 3-51.
119. See Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 525; and Marlene J. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 3-51.
120. See Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, pp. 133, 164.
121. Quoted in John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lufti al-Sayyid-Marsot, "The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November 1978), p. 476.
122. Quoted in A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 289.
123. Sir Evelyn Baring to Archibald Philip Primrose, fifth earl of Rosebery, February 15, 1886. Quoted in Mowat, "From Liberalism to Imperialism," p. 120.
124. Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. xi.
125. Sir Evelyn Baring to George Joachim Goschen, first viscount, February 15, 1890. Quoted in Mowat, "From Liberlism to Imperialism," p. 122.
126. As Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher argue, "The occupation had to go on because it was the only way of retaining supremacy and keeping the lid on the unresolved internal crisis." Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 281. On the effect of the Fashoda crisis on the situation in Egypt, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, pp. 132-133.
127. As Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher argue, "The occupation had to go on because it was the only way of retaining supremacy and keeping the lid on the unresolved internal crisis." Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 281. On the effect of the Fashoda crisis on the situation in Egypt, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, pp. 132-133.
128. On Egyptian dissatisfaction with the British occupation, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer; John Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1970); A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," Journal of African History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), p. 376; David Steele, "Britain and Egypt, 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism," in Keith M. Wilson, ed., Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Mansell, 1983); Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); and William M. Welch Jr., No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in
129. On Egyptian dissatisfaction with the British occupation, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer; John Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1970); A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," Journal of African History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), p. 376; David Steele, "Britain and Egypt, 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism," in Keith M. Wilson, ed., Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Mansell, 1983); Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); and William M. Welch Jr., No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in Egypt, 1883-1907 (New York: Greenwood, 1988).
130. On Egyptian dissatisfaction with the British occupation, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer; John Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1970); A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," Journal of African History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), p. 376; David Steele, "Britain and Egypt, 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism," in Keith M. Wilson, ed., Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Mansell, 1983); Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); and William M. Welch Jr., No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in Egypt, 1883-1907 (New York: Greenwood, 1988).
131. On Egyptian dissatisfaction with the British occupation, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer; John Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1970); A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," Journal of African History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), p. 376; David Steele, "Britain and Egypt, 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism," in Keith M. Wilson, ed., Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Mansell, 1983); Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); and William M. Welch Jr., No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in Egypt, 1883-1907 (New York: Greenwood, 1988).
132. On Egyptian dissatisfaction with the British occupation, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer; John Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1970); A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," Journal of African History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), p. 376; David Steele, "Britain and Egypt, 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism," in Keith M. Wilson, ed., Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Mansell, 1983); Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); and William M. Welch Jr., No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in Egypt, 1883-1907 (New York: Greenwood, 1988).
133. On Egyptian dissatisfaction with the British occupation, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer; John Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1970); A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," Journal of African History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), p. 376; David Steele, "Britain and Egypt, 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism," in Keith M. Wilson, ed., Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Mansell, 1983); Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); and William M. Welch Jr., No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in Egypt, 1883-1907 (New York: Greenwood, 1988).
134. On the dependence of Egyptian rulers on British support, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. 68. Summarizing the influence of Cromer on Egypt, Al-Sayyid concludes, "The Egyptians respected Cromer for his reforms, but they also feared and disliked him for having usurped power and thwarted their leanings towards self-government." Ibid., p. 196.
135. On the dependence of Egyptian rulers on British support, see Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. 68. Summarizing the influence of Cromer on Egypt, Al-Sayyid concludes, "The Egyptians respected Cromer for his reforms, but they also feared and disliked him for having usurped power and thwarted their leanings towards self-government." Ibid., p. 196.
136. For a discussion of the British experience in Egypt, see G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 311-313.
137. See Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914, p. 338.
138. See Niall Ferguson, "True Lies: Lessons from the British Empire," New Republic, June 2, 2003, pp. 16-19; and Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 217-225.
139. See Niall Ferguson, "True Lies: Lessons from the British Empire," New Republic, June 2, 2003, pp. 16-19; and Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 217-225.
140. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, Vol. 10, ed. James D. Richardson (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 131.
141. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. xxviii-xxix.
142. The Teller amendment stated, "The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over [Cuba] except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people." See David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. 24.
143. Events had conspired to make a lengthy occupation of Cuba intolerable. By 1900, according to David Healy, "The circumstances of the past months-the postal scandals and the near-rebellion of Congress, the imminence of the elections of 1900, the embarrassments in the Philippines, Wood's ambition to play a role in the China expedition-had succeeded at last in bringing the administration, the Congress, and the occupation generals into a temporary agreement in favor of early action in Cuba." Ibid., p. 146.
144. Civil Report of Brigadier General Leonard Wood, Military Governor of Cuba, for the Period from January 1 to May 20, 1902, Pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903), p. 271.
145. Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio foresaw the dangerous unintended consequences of the Platt amendment. See Congressional Record, Vol. 34, February 27, 1901 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 3150-3151. For discussion, see Jules Robert Benjamin, The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 63-64; Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902, Vol. 2 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 559-592; Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, p. 165; and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (London: Picador, 2001), pp. 273-274.
146. Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio foresaw the dangerous unintended consequences of the Platt amendment. See Congressional Record, Vol. 34, February 27, 1901 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 3150-3151. For discussion, see Jules Robert Benjamin, The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 63-64; Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902, Vol. 2 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 559-592; Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, p. 165; and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (London: Picador, 2001), pp. 273-274.
147. Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio foresaw the dangerous unintended consequences of the Platt amendment. See Congressional Record, Vol. 34, February 27, 1901 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 3150-3151. For discussion, see Jules Robert Benjamin, The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 63-64; Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902, Vol. 2 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 559-592; Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, p. 165; and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (London: Picador, 2001), pp. 273-274.
148. Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio foresaw the dangerous unintended consequences of the Platt amendment. See Congressional Record, Vol. 34, February 27, 1901 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 3150-3151. For discussion, see Jules Robert Benjamin, The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 63-64; Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902, Vol. 2 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 559-592; Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, p. 165; and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (London: Picador, 2001), pp. 273-274.
149. Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio foresaw the dangerous unintended consequences of the Platt amendment. See Congressional Record, Vol. 34, February 27, 1901 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 3150-3151. For discussion, see Jules Robert Benjamin, The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 63-64; Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902, Vol. 2 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 559-592; Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, p. 165; and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (London: Picador, 2001), pp. 273-274.
150. On the poor preparation for the current occupation of Iraq, see James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 95, No. 1 (January-February, 2004), pp. 52-74.
151. Matray, "Hodge Podge," p. 20; and Jeon Sang Sook, "U.S. Korea Policy and the Moderates during the U.S. Military Government Era," in Oh, Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948, pp. 79-101.
152. Matray, "Hodge Podge," p. 20; and Jeon Sang Sook, "U.S. Korea Policy and the Moderates during the U.S. Military Government Era," in Oh, Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948, pp. 79-101.
153. Thomas, Cuba, p. 245; and Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, p. 84.
154. Thomas, Cuba, p. 245; and Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, p. 84.
155. Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. 85.
156. U.S. Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918-1923, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, p. 36.
157. On the Civil Affairs Training Schools, see Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 206-208.
158. Hugh Borton, "Preparation for the Occupation of Japan," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February 1966), pp. 203-212; Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 156-159; and Earl F. Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 52-66.
159. Hugh Borton, "Preparation for the Occupation of Japan," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February 1966), pp. 203-212; Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 156-159; and Earl F. Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 52-66.
160. Hugh Borton, "Preparation for the Occupation of Japan," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February 1966), pp. 203-212; Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 156-159; and Earl F. Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," in Wolfe, Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 52-66.
161. Lucius D. Clay, "Proconsul of a People, by Another People, for Both Peoples," in Wolfe, ed., Americans As Proconsuls, pp. 103-113.
162. On June 28, 2004, the occupying powers formally returned sovereignty to an Iraqi government. With approximately 150,000 foreign troops remaining in Iraq, however, the de facto occupation continues.
163. On the prospects for democracy in Iraq, see Daniel Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 47-78.
164. On the ratcheting down of goals in Iraq, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Attacks Force Retreat from Wide-Ranging Plans for Iraq," Washington Post, December 28, 2003, p. A01.