On the difficulty of achieving equilibrium in interactive POMDPs

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 2, Issue , 2006, Pages 1131-1136

  Doshi, Prashant ^a   Gmytrasiewicz, Piotr J ^b  

^a University of Georgia ^*  (United States)

^b University of Illinois at Chicago   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BELIEFS; FINITE TIME; STOCHASTIC GAMES;

ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; GAME THEORY; STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING;

INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 33750686270     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (15)

1. Binmore, K. 1982. Essays on Foundations of Game Theory. Pittman.
2. Blackwell, D., and Dubins, L. 1962. Merging of opinions with increasing information. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33(3):882-886.
3. Doob, J. L. 1953. Stochastic Processes. John Wiley and Sons.
4. Fudenberg, D., and Levine, D. 1993. Self confirming equilibrium. Econometrica 61:523-545.
5. Gmytrasiewicz, P. J., and Doshi, P. 2004. A framework for sequential planning in multi-agent settings. In AMAI.
6. Gmytrasiewicz, P., and Doshi, P. 2005. A framework for sequential planning in multiagent settings. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) 24:49-79.
7. Hahn, F. 1973. On the Notion of Equilibrium in Economics: An Inaugural Lecture. Cambridge University Press.
8. Hansen, E.; Bernstein, D.; and Zilberstein, S. 2004. Dynamic programming for partially observable stochastic games. In AAAI.
9. Jordan, J. S. 1995. Bayesian learning in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior 9:8-20.
10. Kadane, J., and Larkey, P. 1982. Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Science 28(2):113-120.
11. Kalai, E., and Lehrer, E. 1993a. Rational learning leads to nash equilibrium. Econometrica 61(5):1019-1045.
12. Kalai, E., and Lehrer, E. 1993b. Subjective equilibrium in repeated games. Econometrica 61(5):1231-1240.
13. Nachbar, J. H., and Zame, W. 1996. Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games. Economic Theory 8:103-122.
14. Nachbar, J. H. 1997. Prediction, optimization, and rational learning in repeated games. Econometrica 65:275-309.
15. Nyarko, Y. 1997. Convergence in economic models with bayesian hierarchies of beliefs. Journal of Economic Theory 74:266-296.