Transfer and transformation in processes of Europeanization

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 45, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 985-1021

  Pedersen, Lene Holm ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750463101     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00646.x     Document Type: Review

References (83)

1. Amundsen, E. & Bergman, L. (2003). The deregulated electricity markets in Norway and Sweden. In J. Glachant & D. Finon (eds), Competition in European electricity markets: A cross-country comparison. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
2. Bakovic, T., Tenebaum, B. & Woolf, F. (2003). Regulation by contract: A new way to privatize electricity distribution (Working Paper 14). Washington, DC: World Bank.
3. Bates, R.H. et al. (1998). Analytic narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
4. Bower, J. (2003). Why OFGEM? Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
5. Brendstrup, S. (2005). Sectoral autonomy as a barrier to liberalisation. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitet, Institut for Statskundskab.
6. Busch, P.O. & Jörgens, H. (2005). International patterns of environmental policy change and convergence. European Environment 15(2): 80-101.
7. Campbell, J.L. & Pedersen, O.K. (eds) (2001). The rise of neoliberalism and institutional analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
8. Capros, P. (2003). Independence of Energy Regulators: New Challenges. Paper presented at the World Forum on Energy Regulation, Rome, 5-9 October.
9. Christensen, T. & Lasgreid, P. (2001). New public management: The transformation of ideas and practice. Aldershot: Ashgate.
10. Clemens, E.S. & Cook, J.M. (1999). Politics and institutionalism: Explaining durability and change. Annual Review of Sociology 25: 441-466.
11. Colliard, C.-A. & Timsit, G. (eds) (1988). Les Autorités Administratives Indépendantes. Paris: PUF.
12. Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) (2000). Memorandum of understanding for establishment of the Council of European Energy Regulators, 7 May 2000. Brussels: CEER. Available online at: www.ceer-eu.org/documents.htm (accessed 19 October 2001).
13. Czarniawska, B. & Joerges, B. (1996). Travels of ideas. In B. Czarniawska & G. Sevon (eds), Translating organizational change. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
14. Dehousse, R. (1997). Regulation by networks in the European Community: The role of European agencies. Journal of European Public Policy 4(2): 246-261.
15. Demarigny, F. (1996). Independent administrative authorities in France and the case of the French Council for Competition. In G. Majone (ed.), Regulating Europe. London: Routledge.
16. Di Maggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Journal of Sociology 48(2): 147-160.
17. Di Maggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. (1991). Introduction. In The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
18. Döhler, M. (2002). Institutional choice and bureaucratic autonomy in Germany. West European Politics 25(1): 101-124.
19. Dolowitz, D.P. & March, D. (2000). Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy making. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13(1): 5-24.
20. Dupuis, G. (1988). Introduction. In C.-A. Colliard & G. Timsit (eds), Les Autorités Administratives Indépendantes. Paris: PUF.
21. European Commission (1996). Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. Strasbourg: European Commission.
22. European Commission (2003). Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. Strasbourg: European Commission.
23. Garrett, G. & Weingast, B.R. (1993). Ideas, interests and institutions: Constructing the European Community's internal market. In J. Goldstein & R.O. Keohane (eds), Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions and political change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
24. Gilardi, E (2002). Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: A comparative empirical analysis. Journal of European Public Policy 9(6): 873-893.
25. Gonenc, R., Maher, M. & Nicoletti, G. (2000). The implementation and the effects of regulatory reform: Past experience and current issues. Paris: OECD.
26. Gourevitch, P.A. (1989). Keynesian politics: The political sources of economic policy choices. In P.A. Hall (ed.), The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
27. Hall, P.A. (ed.) (1989). The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
28. Hall, P.A. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning and the state:The case of economic policy making in Britain. Comparative Politics 25(3): 275-296.
29. Hall, P.A. & Taylor, R.C.R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political Studies 44(5): 936-957.
30. Hall, P.A. & Taylor, R.C.R. (1998). The potential of historical institutionalism: A response to Hay and Wincott. Political Studies 46(5): 958-962.
31. Horn, M.J. (1995). The political economy of public administration: Institutional choice in the public sector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32. International Energy Agency (IEA). (1999). Energy policies of IEA: Finland 2000 review. Paris: OECD/IEA.
33. International Energy Agency (IEA). (2000). Energy policies of IEA: Sweden 2000 review. Paris: OECD/IEA.
34. International Energy Agency (IEA). (2001 a). Energy policies of IEA: Norway 2001 review. Paris: OECD/IEA.
35. International Energy Agency (IEA). (2001b). Regulatory institutions in liberalized electricity markets. Paris: OECD/IEA.
36. International Energy Agency (IEA). (2001c). Energy policies of IEA: Portugal 2000 review. Paris: OECD/IEA.
37. Jordan, A. et al. (2003). European governance and the transfer of'new' environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) in the European Union. Public Administration 81(3): 555.
38. Johannsen, K.S., Pedersen, L.H. & Sørensen, E. (2004). Independent regulatory authorities: A comparative study of European energy regulators. Copenhagen: AKF-Forlaget.
39. Jörgens, H. (2004). Governance by diffusion: Implementing global norms through cross-national imitation and learning. In W. Lafferty (ed.), Governance for sustainable development: The challenge of adapting form to function. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
40. Knill, C. (2001). The Europeanization of national administrations: Patterns of institutional change and persistence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
41. Knill, C. (2005). Introduction. Cross-national policy convergence: Concepts, approaches and explanatory factors. Journal of European Public Policy 12(5): 764-775.
42. Kydland, F. & Prescott, E. (1977). Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy 85: 473-490.
43. Laffont, J.J. & Tirole, J. (1993). A theory of incentives in procurements and regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
44. Larsen, A. et al. (forthcoming). Independent regulatory authorities in European electricity markets. Energy Policy.
45. Levi-Faur, D. (2003). The politics of liberalization: Privatization and regulation-forcompetition in Europe's and Latin America's telecoms and electricity industries. European Journal of Political Research 42: 705-740.
46. Lundqvist, L.J. (1980). The hare and the tortoise: Clean air politics in the United States and Sweden. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
47. Majone, G. (ed.) (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge.
48. Majone, G. (2001). Nonmajoritarian institutions and the limits of democratic governance: A political transaction-cost approach. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 157: 57-78.
49. Makkai, T. & Braithwaite, J. (1989). In and out of the revolving door: Making sense of regulatory capture. In R. Baldwin, C. Scott & C. Hood (eds), A reader on regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
50. March, J. (1999). A learning perspective on the network dynamics of institutional integration. In M. Egeberg & P. Laegreid (eds), Organizing political institutions: Essays for Johan P. Olsen. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
51. McNamara, K. (2002). Rational fictions: Central bank independence and the social logic of delegation. West European Politics 25(1): 47-76.
52. Meyer, J.W. & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340-363.
53. Meyer, J.W., Boli, J. & Thomas, G.M. (1994). Ontology and rationalization in the Western cultural account. In I. Scott et al. (eds), Institutional environments and organizations: Structural complexity and individualism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
54. Mitnick, B. (1980). The political economy of regulation. New York: Columbia University Press.
55. Offical Journal (OJ) (2003). Commission decision of 11 November 2003 on establishing the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas. Official Journal of the European Union, 14 November.
56. Olsen, J.P. (2002). The many faces of Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies 40(5): 921-952.
57. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2001). Regulatory institutions in liberalized electricity markets. Paris: OECD/IEA.
58. Oxford Economic Research Associates (OXERA) (2000). Energy liberalization indicators in Europe. Oxford: OXERA.
59. Padgett, S. (2003). Between synthesis and emulation: EU policy transfer in the power sector. Journal of European Public Policy 10(2): 227-245.
60. Peltzman, S. (1989). The economic theory of regulation after a decade of deregulation. In R. Baldwin, C. Scott & C. Hood (eds), A reader on regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
61. Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G.R. (1978). The external control of organizations. New York: Harper & ROW.
62. Pierson, P. & Skocpol, T. (2002). Historical institutionalism in contemporary political science. In I. Katznelson & H. Milner (eds), Political Science: State of the discipline. New York: Norton & Co.
63. Pollitt, C. & Talbot, C. (eds) (2004). Unbundled government: A critical analysis of the global trend to agencies, quangos and contractualization. London: Routledge.
64. Radaelli, CM. (2000). Policy transfer in the European Union: Institutional isomorphism asa source of legitimacy. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13(1): 25-43.
65. Richardson, J. (ed.) (1982). Policy styles in Western Europe. London: Allan & Unwin.
66. Richardson, J. (2000). Government, interest groups and policy change. Political Studies 48(5): 1006-1025.
67. Røvik, K.A. (1996). Deinstitutionalization and the logic of fashion. In B. Czarniawska & G. Sevon (eds), Translating organizational change. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
68. Røvik, K.A. (1998). Moderne Organisationer. Trender I organisasjonstenkningen ved tusenårsskiftet. Copenhagen: Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS.
69. Sahlin-Anderson, K. (1996). Imitating by editing success: The construction of organizational fields. In B. Czarniawska & G. Sevon (eds), Translating organizational change. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
70. Sahlin-Anderson, K. (2001). National, international and transnational constructions of new public management. In T. Christensen & P. Lægreid (eds), New public management: The transformation of ideas and practice. Aldershot: Ashgate.
71. Schneiberg, M. & Clemens, E.S. (forthcoming). The typical tools for the job: Research strategies in institutional analysis. In W.W. Powell & D.L. Jones (eds), How institutions change. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
72. Smith W. (1997). Utility regulators: The independence debate. Public Policy for the Private Sector (Note 27). Available online at: www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/notes/competition. htm (accessed 10 July 2001).
73. Stern, J. (1997). Effective utility regulation and independent regulation: What makes an independent regulator independent? Business Strategy Review 8(2): 67-74.
74. Stern, J. & Holder, S. (1998). Regulatory governance: Criteria for assessing the performance of regulatory systems. An application to infrastructure industries in the developing countries of Asia (Consultant's Report, August 1997). Washington, DC: World Bank.
75. Stigler, G. (1971). The economic theory of regulation. Bell Journal of Economics 2: 3-21.
76. Tews, K., Busch, P.-O. & Jörgens, H. (2003). The diffusion of new environmental policy instruments. European Journal of Political Research 42(4): 569-600.
77. Thatcher, M. (2002a). Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. West European Politics 25(1): 1-22.
78. Thatcher, M. (2002b). Delegation to independent regulatory agencies: Pressures, functions and contextual mediation. West European Politics 25(1): 125-147.
79. Thatcher, M. (2002e). Regulation after delegation: Independent regulatory agencies in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 9(6): 954-972.
80. Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 369-404.
81. Vogel, D. (1986). National styles of regulation: Environmental policy in Great Britain and the United States. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
82. Weir, M. (1992). Ideas and the politics of bounded innovation. In S. Steinmo, K. Thelen & F. Longstreth (eds), Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
83. World Forum of Energy Regulation (WFER) (2003). Draft guidelines for energy regulation and regulatory practice. Washington, DC: WFER.