The politics of liberalisation: Privatisation and regulation-for-competition in Europe's and Latin America's telecoms and electricity industries

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 42, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 705-740

  Levi Faur, David ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141953167     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00101     Document Type: Article

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