Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 81, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 478-499

  Bac, Mehmet ^a   Bag, Parimal Kanti ^b  

^a SABANCI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bounty hunter mechanism; Collusion; Corruption; Monitoring

Indexed keywords

COLLISION; CORRUPTION; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; LAW ENFORCEMENT; MONITORING; POLICY MAKING;

EID: 33750013720     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.06.007     Document Type: Article

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