Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections

Applied Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 19, 2006, Pages 2285-2298

  Vermeir, Jan ^a   Heyndels, Bruno ^a  

^a VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; MODEL; TAX SYSTEM;

BELGIUM; BENELUX; EURASIA; EUROPE; FLANDERS; WESTERN EUROPE;

EID: 33749666010     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: 14664283     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00036840500427536     Document Type: Article

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