Presidential address: Consequences of constitutions

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 2, Issue 2-3, 2004, Pages 139-161

  Persson, Torsten ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749330103     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/154247604323067907     Document Type: Article

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