Divisional power, intra-firm bargaining and rent-seeking behavior in multidivisional corporations

Economics Bulletin

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Mudambi, Ram ^a,b   Navarra, Pietro ^c,d  

^a TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MESSINA   (Italy)

^d LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749076574     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15452921     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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