Splitting the difference? Causal Inference and theories of split-party delegations

Political Analysis

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 439-455

  Butler, Daniel M ^a   Butler, Matthew J ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748803580     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpj010     Document Type: Article

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