Other-regarding preferences: Egalitarian warm glow, empathy, and group size

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 20-41

  Stahl, Dale O ^a   Haruvy, Ernan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Egalitarianism; Empathy; Group size; Other regarding preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748141988     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.10.008     Document Type: Article

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