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Volumn 21, Issue 9, 2006, Pages 476-478

Cooperation should not be assumed

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; SEXUAL SELECTION; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 33747191170     PISSN: 01695347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tree.2006.07.005     Document Type: Short Survey
Times cited : (15)

References (21)
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    • The continuous prisoner's dilemma and the evolution of cooperation through reciprocal altruism with variable investment
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    • Stability in negotiation games and the emergence of cooperation
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