The stability of cooperation involving variable investment

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 215, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 47-56

  Sherratt, Thomas N ^a   Roberts, Gilbert ^b  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; INVESTMENT; MUTUALISM; STABILITY ANALYSIS;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; INVESTMENT; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SIMULATION; SYMBIOSIS;

EID: 0036354189     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2495     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation
2. The evolution of interspecific mutualisms
3. The evolution of degrees of cooperation
4. The evolution of forgiveness
5. Familiarity breeds cooperation
6. Raise the stakes evolve into a defector
7. Variable investment, the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma, and the origin of cooperation
8. The spatial spread of altruism versus the evolutionary response of egoists
9. Evolution of cooperation between individuals
10. Chaos in cooperation: Continuous-valued Prisoner's Dilemmas in infinite-valued logic
11. More evolution of cooperation
12. Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity
13. Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
14. Development of cooperative relationships through increasing investment
15. Raise the stakes evolves into a defector. Reply
16. The evolution of quantitatively responsive cooperative trade
17. The importance of phenotypic defectors in stabilising reciprocal atruism
18. The continuous Prisoner's Dilemma: I. Linear reactive strategies
19. The continuous Prisioner's Dilemma: II. Linear reactive strategies with noise
20. Reciprocal food sharing in vampire bats