Reproductive social behavior: Cooperative games to replace sexual selection

Science

Volumn 311, Issue 5763, 2006, Pages 965-970

  Roughgarden, Joan ^a   Oishi, Meeko ^b   Akçay, Erol ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECOSYSTEMS; GENES; GENETIC ENGINEERING;

ECOLOGICAL BENEFITS; GENETIC BENEFITS; OFFSPRING; SEXUAL SELECTION THEORY;

BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING;

BEHAVIOR;

BIRD; COOPERATION; DYNAMICS; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; NONHUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REVIEW; SEXUAL BEHAVIOR; SEXUAL SELECTION; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL STRUCTURE; SOCIETY; THEORY;

ANIMALS; CHARADRIIFORMES; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; MALE; MATHEMATICS; OVIPOSITION; PERCIFORMES; SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, ANIMAL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ANIMALIA; AVES;

EID: 33144485891     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1110105     Document Type: Review

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44. M.O. was supported by NSF Career Award EC5-9985072 (principle investigator; C. Tomlin, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Stanford University).