Negotiating Europe: The politics of religion and the prospects for Turkish accession

Review of International Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 401-418

  Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746890505     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S026021050600708X     Document Type: Review

References (103)

1. Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), note 6, p. 7 (emphasis in original).
2. Luis Lugo, Director, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 'Does 'Muslim' Turkey Belong in "Christian" Europe?' (Discussion, The National Press Club, Washington, DC, 13 January 2005.)
3. See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, 'The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations', European Journal of International Relations, 10:2 (June 2004): pp. 242-52:
4. and Hurd, "The International Politics of Secularism: US Foreign Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29:2 (2004), p. 116.
5. On how the notion of 'Europe' has become embedded in key state and national identities thereby contributing to the establishment of a security community, see Ole Wæver, 'security, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community', in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69-160.
6. Wæver argues that 'the regional identity 'Europe' clearly has become more important and today plays a key role In self conceptions. Its meaning is not settled once and for all, but of the concepts of state and nation that compete, most are thoroughly Europeanized' (p. 98).
7. As Bahar Rumelili argues, 'the EU is implicated in an identity interaction with its Turkish 'other' that makes the European identity more insecure'. Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation', Review of International Studies, 30 (2004), p. 45.
8. Nilüfer Göle, 'Islam in Public', Public Culture, 14:1 (2002), p. 183. I am grateful to Karen Alter for this phrase.
9. David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, The Emerging European Union, 3rd edn. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2004), p. 124,
10. citing European Commission, Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community, Sec. (89) 2290 final (Brussels: Official Publications of the European Communities, 18 December 1989).
11. Wood and Yosilada, The Emerging European Union, p. 124.
12. Wood and Yosilada, The Emerging European Union, Ibid., p. 125.
13. Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar, 'Turkey's European Quest: The EU's Decision on Turkish Accession', (US-Europe Analysis Series, Center on the United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution, September 2004).
14. Wood and Yesilada, p. 125. Hasan Kösebalaban attributes this about face on the part of the Europeans to the rise of social democratic governments in Europe, and particularly in Germany. Hasan Kösebalaban, Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures', Middle East Policy, 9:2 (2002), pp. 136-7.
15. Gordon and Taspinar, "Turkey's European Quest', pp. 2-4.
16. On these reforms see also Michael Emerson, 'Has Turkey Fulfilled the Copenhagen Political Criteria?', Centre for European Policy Studies, Brief no. 48 (April 2004).
17. Kösebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures', p. 137.
18. Phillips, "Turkey's Dreams of Accession', p. 94.
19. Gordon and Taspinar, Turkey's European Quest', p. 4.
20. William Chislett, "Turkey's Membership in the European Union: A Rose or a Thorn?' Real Institute Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, (http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/ imprimir/10limp.asp) (accessed 16 June 2004).
21. On this process see Erkan Erdogdu, Turkey and Europe: Undivided but not United', Middle East Review of International Affairs, 6:2 (2002).
22. For survey results see Kösebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures', p. 138.
23. On disagreements within the European Parliament concerning Turkish accession see Senem Aykin, 'Views on Turkish Accession from the European Parliament', Center for European Policy Studies Turkey in Europe Monitor, issue 4 (April 2004);
24. and Nathalie Tocci, Turkey and the European Union: Preparing for the December 2004 European Council', Working Paper, 'Brainstorming: Developments in EL) Turkey Relations', Mediterranean Programme Workshop, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute (7 May 2004).
25. Gordon and Taspinar, Turkey's European Quest', p. 4.
26. See also Daniel Dombey and Vincent Boland, 'Brussels says "Yes" to Turkish entry talks', The Financial Times, 1 October 2004, p. 2. Eurobarometer survey number 56 suggested that 34 per cent of the EU 15 public supports Turkish membership and 46 per cent, opposes it. (20 per cent had no opinion).
27. Cited in Wood and Yesilada, The Emerging European Union, p. 123.
28. The argument is that the EU could not absorb Turkey's massive agricultural production into its subsidy programme, which places limits on agricultural outputs to guard against overproduction.
29. See Ziya Önis, 'Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkoy-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era', Turkish Studies, 4 (2003)
30. and Önis, 'Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence', Contemporary Politics, 7 (2001), pp. 281-98.
31. On the Greek Orthodox minority and obstacles to religious freedom in Turkey see Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Turkey between Secularism and Fundamentalism?: The "Muslimhood Model" and the Greek Orthodox Minority', The Brandywine Review of Faith and International Affairs, 3:1 (2005), pp. 11-22.
32. See the debate surrounding the French referendum of 29 May 2005 on the European Constitution.
33. Of course the definition of 'Europe' is itself at stake in this debate, As Rumelili observes, 'Europe is merely a geographical construct, with no natural or pre-given boundaries; the geographical parameters of Europe have riot only shifted throughout the centuries but also within the short history of the European "community" as well'. Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference', pp. 39-40.
34. Gordon and Taspinar, 'Turkey's European Quest', p. 5.
35. On the historical definition of 'Europe' see J. G. A. Pocock, 'What do we mean by Europe?', Wilson Quarterly, 21:1 (1997), Pocock argues that contemporary Europe 'is a set. of arrangements designed to ensure that peoples will not again define themselves as states, and will surrender both the power to make war and the power to control the movements of market forces'.
36. Gordon and Taspinar, Turkey's European Quest', pp. 4-5.
37. Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, Head of the Cabinet of former EU Commissioner Franz Fischler, 'Does "Muslim" Turkey Belong in "Christian" Europe?' (Discussion, The National Press Club, Washington, DC, 13 January 2005).
38. Interview with Le Monde, 8 November 2002. Echoing the original language of the Treaty of Rome, the Maastrict Treaty prescribes that 'any European State may apply to become a Member of the Union'. Article 0 under the Final Provisions (Title VII) of the Maastricht Treaty (7 February 1992).
39. Kösebalaban, Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures', p. 146, note 18, citing Helmut Schmidt, Die Selbstbehauptung Europas, Perspectiven für das 21, Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2000).
40. Cited in Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip L. Martin, 'Is Turkey Ready for Europe?' Foreign Affairs (May/June 2003), p. 98.
41. Cited in Bruno Waterfield, 'Bolkestein: EU faces 'implosion risk over Turkey', EUPolitix.com, 〈http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200409/Oc.501627- c886-4fcl-95c.2-e49c1945898a.htm) (published 7 September 2004; accessed 16 May 2005〉.
42. Karl Kettler, Letter to the Editor, The Economist, 21 December 2002, p. 12.
43. Diane Wolff, 'Encounter with Islam', Orlando Sentinel, 13 February 2005).
44. On the postcolonial cultural and historical context of the recent events in France see Paul Silverstein and Chantal Tetreault, 'Urban Violence in France', Middle East Report Online, November 2005: 〈http://www.merip.org/ mero/interventions/silverstein_tetreault_interv.htm〉 (accessed 28 November 2005)
45. and on Muslims in Europe more generally see the special issue on the subject of Hagar: Studies in Culture, Polity and Identities, 6:1 (2005).
46. As Silverstein and Tetreault argue, 'the rage expressed by young men from the cités does not spring from anti-imperialist Arab nationalism or some sort of anti-Western jihadism . . . but rather from lifetimes of rampant unemployment, school failure, police harassment and everyday discrimination that tends to treat the youths as the racaille of Sarkozy's insult - regardless of race, ethnicity or religion'. Ibid.
47. As Lynch has shown in her study of attitudes to religious pluralism in theological discourse, there are many subtle variations in and alternatives to the categories 'exclusivism' and 'inclusivism.' She describes four such attitudes: exclusivism (my belief is superior and the only truth); inclusivism (my belief is right but yours may contain partial truths): pluralism (truth is multiple, other beliefs are equal to my own); and syncretism (it is possible and inevitable to merge aspects of different belief systems). Applying this framework to my argument, Judeo-Christian secularist approaches to European identity would be categorised as exclusivist, while their laicist counterparts would be generally inclusivist, with an occasional sprinkling of pluralism and syncretism. Cecelia Lynch, 'Dogma, Praxis, and Religious Perspectives on Multiculturalism', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29:3 (2000), pp. 741-59.
48. Charles Taylor, 'Modern Social Imaginaries', Public Culture. 14:1 (2002), p. 106.
49. Alev Çinar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 9. Secularist ideologies also can be situated in what Halliday has described as a 'triple, explanatory context': (1) socialisation, or why and how particular ideas are transmitted and adjusted over time and by different groups of leaders: (2) comparison, looking at how ideas in one setting are similar to and/or differ from those in another set of circumstances; (3) historical context, examining the social and historical sources and appeals of particular sets of beliefs.
50. Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 227-8.
51. Charles Taylor, 'Walls of Separation: A Metaphor Which Has Outlived its Time', Keynote Address, Conference on Theology, Faith & Politics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, (13 May 2005).
52. Hurd, 'The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations', p. 247.
53. See, for example, Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
54. For a critique see Adam Sabra, 'What is Wrong with "What went Wrong"?', Middle East Report Online, August 2003: (http://www.merip.org/ mero/ interventions/sabra_interv.html) (accessed 16 May 2005).
55. On the cultural boundaries of democracy see Alfred Stepan, The World's Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the "Twin Tolerations" ', Journal of Democracy, 11 (October 2000), pp. 37-57.
56. 'On rejetera la candidature turque à l'Union européeene moins parce que l'Etat turc ne satisfait pas les exigences démocratiques, ce qui serait une bonne raison, que parce que la société turque n'est pas 〈européeene〉, c'est-à-dire ne partage pas le fonds de christianisme qui fonde sa laïcité meme'. Olivier Roy, Vers un Islam européen (Paris: Editions Esprit, 1999), p. 10 (translation mine).
57. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 158.
58. 'Britons back Christian society', BBC News World Edition: 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 4434096.stm〉 (accessed 29 November 2005).
59. See Nilüfer Cole, 'Negotiating Europeanism and Republicanism: The Turkish Question in France', Paper presentation, Cultures of Democracy conference, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois (21 April 2005).
60. Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference1, p. 44.
61. Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference1, Ibid., p. 39.
62. Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference1, 39 Ibid.
63. Sociologist of religion David Martin has suggested that, 'the relative lack of the religious/secular distinction within Islam has serious consequences'. Martin, 'Religion, Secularity, Secularism and European Integration', Paper presented at a workshop on Secularization and Religion, Erfurt, Germany, 17 July 2003).
64. Silversteiri and Tetreault, 'Urban Violence in France'.
65. On the origins of laicism and its implications for IR, see Hurd, The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations', pp. 242-6.
66. As Andrew Davison has shown, 'secularism' and 'laicism' should not be conflated: 'secularism and laicism are not two different, words for the same institutional arrangement, but rather two distinct, complex, varied, contested, and dynamic possibilities in the range of nontheocratic polities'. For Davison Turkey is laicist rather than secularist because the Kernalists did not seek to separate religion from the state and pursue a nonreligious state inasmuch as they sought to use the state to control, regulate and mix Islam and politics in a particular way. Davison, Turkey, a "Secular" State? The Challenge of Description', The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102:2/3 (2003), p. 333.
67. An example is the French debate in late 2003 and early 2004 over the findings of the Stasi Commission and the passage of legislation restricting religious expression in public spaces. See John R. Bowen, 'Muslims and Citizens', Boston Review (February/March 2004).
68. Davison, "Turkey, a "Secular" State?', p. 344.
69. See also Fred Halliday, "Turkey 1998: Seculsirism in Question', in Nation and Religion in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 183.
70. Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference', p. 44.
71. Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference', 44 Ibid.
72. Wæver, 'Insecurity, Security and Asecurity', p. 100.
73. On commonalities and differences between European countries vis-à-vis the decline of individual and collective religious belief and expression, see Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf, The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe: 1750-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
74. Grace Davie, Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000);
75. René Rémond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999),
76. and Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
77. See M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003);
78. Jenny White, Islamic Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002);
79. and Soner Cagaptay, Islam. Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk? (New York: Routledge, 2006).
80. For an example of the argument that 'much of Atatürk's legacy risks being lost' in contemporary Turkey, see Robert L. Pollack, "The Sick Man of Europe-Again', The Wall Street Journal, 16 February 2005, p. A14.
81. David L. Phillips, "Turkey's Dreams of Accession', Foreign Affairs, 〈September/October 2004〉, p. 89. Philips adds: 'although the US government officially supports Erdogan, some Pentagon officials are uneasy about his Islamic orientation. They believe that the Turkish armed forces arc far more reliable than the AKP in fighting terrorism' (p. 97).
82. Hurd, "The International Politics of Secularism', p. 119. Other Europeans express concern with the implications of the Kemalist model for democratisation and in particular religious freedom in Turkey.
83. Kösebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures', p. 138.
84. Erhard Franz, 'Secularism and Islamism in Turkey', in Kai Hafez (ed.), The Islamic World and the West: An Introduction to Political Cultures and International Relations 〈Leiden: Brill, 2000〉, p. 173.
85. 〈http://europa.eu.int/comm/englargement/docs/pdf/ st20002_en05_TR_framedoc.pdf〉, accessed 21 November 2005.
86. Fabrizio Barbaso, 'Turkey-EU Relations in the perspective of the December European Council', Ankara, Middle East Technical University, 25 May 2004.
87. Cöle, 'Negotiating Europeanism'.
88. It may be best that it remain so. As Ole Wæver has suggested, 'maybe Europe is not even that much of a we, but a way, a how, where there is more and more of a European flavor to being French, German, and so on ... "Europe" should be soon neither as a project replacing the nation/state nor as irrelevant. It is an additional layer of identification.' Wæver, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity', p. 94.
89. White, Turkey's Now "Muslimhood"', p. 9.
90. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, p. 212.
91. Taylor, 'Modern Social Imaginaries', p. 91. On the concept of multiple modernities,
92. see also S. N. Eisenstadt, 'The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29:3 (2000), pp. 591-611.
93. Göle, 'Islam in Public', p. 175.
94. Göle, 'Islam in Public', Ibid., pp. 173, 183.
95. Çinar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey, p. 171.
96. Talip Kucukcan, 'State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modern Turkey: Reconfiguration of Religion in the Public Sphere', BYU Law Review, 2 (2003), p. 493.
97. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, p. 267.
98. Çinar, Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, p. 173.
99. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 180.
100. peter van der Veer, "The Moral state', in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds.), Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), P. 39.
101. For an alternative approach to the interface between the domestic and the international that explains the collapse of overseas empires in terms of institutional factors within the metropolitan countries, son Hondrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
102. See Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 466.
103. This view is expressed in Huntington's observation that, 'modern Western man, being unable for the most part, to assign a dominant and central place to religion in his own affairs, found himself unable to conceive that any other peoples In any other place could have done so, and was therefore impelled to devise other explanations of what seemed to him only superficial phenomena'. Samuel Huntington, 'The Return of Islam', Commentary, 61:1 (January 1976), p. 40.