Does auctioning of entry licences induce collusion? An experimental study

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 769-791

  Offerman, Theo ^a   Potters, Jan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MONOPOLY; OLIGOPOLY; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 33745856916     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00395.x     Document Type: Article

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