On the convergence of national corporate governance systems

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 57-81

  Braendle, Udo C ^a   Noll, Juergen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORPORATE STRATEGY; ECONOMIC SYSTEM; ECONOMIC THEORY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 33745808792     PISSN: 02601079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/02601079X06001700105     Document Type: Article

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