A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2914, Issue , 2003, Pages 1-12

  Backes, Michael ^a   Pfitzmann, Birgit ^a  

^a IBM RESEARCH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MOBILE SECURITY; NETWORK SECURITY; SOFTWARE ENGINEERING;

AUTOMATIC PROOFS; DOLEV-YAO MODEL; INTEGRITY PRESERVATIONS; NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER; PROVABLY SECURE; PUBLIC-KEY PROTOCOL; SECURITY PROOFS; SECURITY PROTOCOLS;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 35248896750     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-24597-1_1     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. M. Abadi and A. D. Gordon. A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus. Information and Computation, 148(1):1-70, 1999.
2. M. Abadi and J. Jürjens. Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation. In Proc. 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software (TACS), pages 82-94, 2001.
3. M. Abadi and P. Rogaway. Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational soundness of formal encryption). Journal of Cryptology, 15(2):103-127, 2002.
4. M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675-686. Springer, 2003.
5. M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2003/121, June 2003. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
6. M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. A universally composable cryptographic library. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2003/015, Jan. 2003. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
7. M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval, and P. Rogaway. Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '98, volume 1462 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 26-45. Springer, 1998.
8. M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Entity authentication and key distribution. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '93, volume 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 232-249. Springer, 1994.
9. M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. A logic for authentication. Technical Report 39, SRC DIGITAL, 1990.
10. R. Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In Proc. 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 136-145, 2001.
11. D. Dolev and A. C. Yao. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 29(2):198-208, 1983.
12. O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. How to play any mental game-or-a completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In Proc. 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 218-229, 1987.
13. S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 28:270-299, 1984.
14. S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems. SIAM Journal on Computing, 18(1):186-207, 1989.
15. R. Kemmerer. Analyzing encryption protocols using formal verification techniques. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 7(4):448-457, 1989.
16. G. Lowe. An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. Information Processing Letters, 56(3):131-135, 1995.
17. G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In Proc. 2nd International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS), volume 1055 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 147-166. Springer, 1996.
18. C. Meadows. Using narrowing in the analysis of key management protocols. In Proc. 10th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pages 138-147, 1989.
19. C. Meadows. Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol: A comparison of two approaches. In Proc. 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), volume 1146 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 351-364. Springer, 1996.
20. J. K. Millen. The interrogator: A tool for cryptographic protocol security. In Proc. 5th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pages 134-141, 1984.
21. R. Needham and M. Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers. Communications of the ACM, 12(21):993-999, 1978.
22. L. Paulson. The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Cryplology, 6(1):85-128, 1998.
23. B. Pfitzmann, M. Schunter, and M. Waidner. Provably secure certified mail. Research Report RZ 3207, IBM Research, 2000. http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/publications/.
24. B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner. A model for asynchronous reactive systems and its application to secure message transmission. In Proc. 22nd IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pages 184-200, 2001.
25. S. Schneider. Verifying authentication protocols with CSP. In Proc. 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 3-17, 1997.
26. P. Syverson. A new look at an old protocol. Operation Systems Review, 30(3):1-4, 1996.
27. F. J. Thayer Fabrega, J. C. Herzog, and J. D. Guttman. Strand spaces: Why is a security protocol correct? In Proc. 19th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pages 160-171, 1998.
28. B. Warinschi. A computational analysis of the Needham-Schroeder-(Lowe) protocol. In Proc. 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 248-262, 2003.