Bargaining and the failure of asymmetric deterrence: Trading off the risk of war for the promise of a better deal

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 159-180

  Langlois, Catherine C ^a   Langlois, Jean Pierre P ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Deterrence; Equilibrium selection; Ex post value

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744969320     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940600665974     Document Type: Review

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