The expanding definition of framing and its particular impact on economic experimentation

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 229-243

  Elliott, Catherine S ^a   Hayward, Donald M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032337775     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1053-5357(99)80086-9     Document Type: Article

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