Second-price auction tournament

Economics Letters

Volumn 92, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 99-107

  Shogren, Jason F ^a   Parkhurst, Gregory M ^b   McIntosh, Christopher ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

^b MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Experiments; Tournaments

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744526133     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.020     Document Type: Article

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