Endogenous timing in a gaming tournament

Theory and Decision

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-21

  Baik, Kyung Hwan ^b   Cherry, Todd L ^a   Kroll, Stephan ^a   Shogren, Jason F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

^b Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Contests; Gaming tournament; Timing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003162955     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005033020124     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Baik, K.H. (1994), Effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players, Southern Economics Journal 61: 367-379.
2. Baik, K.H. and Shogren, J. (1992), Strategic behavior in contests: Comment, American Economic Review 82: 359-362.
3. Boyd, D. and Boyd, L. (1995), Strategic behavior in contests: Evidence from the 1992 Barcelona-Olympic-games, Applied Economics 27: 1037-1043.
4. Butler, J. and Moffitt, R. (1982), A computationally efficient quadrature procedure for the one factor multinomial probit model, Econometrica 50: 761-764.
5. Camerer, C. (1997), Progress in behavioral game theory, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11: 167-188.
6. Camerer, C., Johnson, E., Rymon, T. and Sen, S. (1993), Cognition and framing in sequential bargaining for gains and losses, in: Contributions to Game Theory, K. Binmore, A. Kirman, and P. Tani (eds.), Cambridge, MIT Press, pp. 27-47.
7. De Bondt, R. (1997), Spillovers and innovation actions, International Journal of Industrial Organization 15: 1-28.
8. De Bondt, R. and Henrique, I. (1995), Strategic investments with asymmetric spillovers, Canadian Journal of Economics 28: 656-674.
9. Dixit, A. (1987), Strategic behavior in contests, American Economic Review 77: 891-898.
10. Drago, R., Garvey, G. and Turnbull, G. (1996), A collective tournament, Economics Letters 50: 223-227.
11. Ehrenberg, R. and Bognanno, M. (1990), Do tournaments have incentive effects?, Journal of Political Economy 98: 1307-1324.
12. Frank, R. and Cook, P. (1996), The Winner-Take-All Society. Why the Few at the Top Get so Much More than the Rest of Us, New York, Penguin USA.
13. Friedman, D. and Sunder, S. (1994), Experimental Economics: A Primer, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
14. Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1991), Game Theory, Cambridge, MIT Press.
15. Harrison, G. (1989), Theory and misbehavior in first-price auctions, American Economic Review 79: 749-762.
16. Harrison, G. and Hirshleifer, J. (1989), An experimental evaluation of weakest link/best shot models of public goods, Journal of Political Economy 97: 201-225.
17. Hirshleifer, J. (1995), Theorizing about conflict, in: Handbook of Defense Economics, K. Hartley and T. Sandler (eds.) Amsterdam, North-Holland.
18. Hurley, T. and Shogren, J. (1997), Environmental conflicts and the SLAPP, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 33: 253-273.
19. Jensen, M. and Murphy, K. J. (1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98: 225-264.
20. Kagel, J. (1995), Auctions: A survey of experimental research, in: Handbook of Experimental Economics, J. Kagel and A. Roth (eds.), Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, pp. 501-585.
21. Lazear, E. and Rosen, S. (1981), Rank-order tournaments as optimal labor contracts, Journal of Political Economy 89: 841-864.
22. Leininger, W. (1993), More efficient rent-seeking - A Münchhausen solution, Public Choice 75: 43-62.
23. McKelvey, R. and Palfrey, T. (1992), An experimental study of the centipede game, Econometrica 60: 803-836.
24. Neale, M. and Bazerman, M. (1991), Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation, New York, Free Press.
25. Nitzan, S. (1994), More on more efficient rent seeking, Public Choice 79: 355-356.
26. Ochs, J. and Roth, A. (1989), An experimental study of sequential bargaining, American Economic Review 79: 355-384.
27. Roth, A. (1995), Bargaining experiments, in: Handbook of Experimental Economics, J. Kagel and A. Roth (eds.), Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, pp. 253-348.
28. Plott, C. (1996), Rational individual behavior in markets and social choice processes, in: The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior, K. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C. Schmidt (eds.), London and New York, MacMillan and St. Martin Press.
29. Selten, R. (1965), Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 12: 301-324.
30. Shogren, J. (1997), Self-interest and equity in a bargaining tournament with non-linear payoffs, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 32: 383-394.
31. Shogren, J. and Baik, K. H. (1991), Reexamining rent seeking in the laboratory, Public Choice 69: 69-79.
32. Shogren, J. and Baik, K. H. (1992), Favorites and underdogs: Strategic behavior in an experimental contest, Public Choice 74: 191-205.
33. Shogren, J. and Hurley, T. (1997), Tournament incentives in environmental policy, in: Sustainability and Global Environmental Policy, A. Dragun and K. Jacobsson (eds.), Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, pp. 213-232.
34. Syropoulus, A. (1994), Endogenous timing in games of commercial-policy, Canadian Journal of Economics 27: 847-864.