Impact fees, growth management, and development: A contractual approach to local policy and governance

Urban Affairs Review

Volumn 41, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 749-768

  Jeong, Moon Gi ^a   Feiock, Richard C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO   (United States)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Administrative capacity; Economic development; Growth management; Impact fees; Local governance; Local government; Local policy; Political institutions

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ECONOMIC POLICY; URBAN ECONOMY;

FLORIDA [UNITED STATES]; NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 33744504193     PISSN: 10780874     EISSN: 15528332     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1078087406287165     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. Altshuler, A. A., and J. Gomez-Ibanez. 1993. Regulation for revenue: The political economy of land development exactions. Washington, DC: Brookings and Lincoln Institute.
2. Auerhahn, E. 1988. Implementing an impact fee system: Ten years of experience in Broward County, Florida. Journal of American Planning Association 54 (Winter): 67-70.
3. Beck, N. 2001. Time-series-cross-section data: What have we learned in the past few years? Annual Review of Political Science 2001 (4): 271-293.
4. Beck, N., and J. N. Katz. 1995. What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data. American Political Science Review 89 (3): 634-647.
5. Beck, N., and J. N. Katz. 1996. Nuisance vs. substance: Specifying and estimating time-series-cross-section models. Political Analysis 6:1-36.
6. Benton, J. E. 2002. County service delivery: Does government structure matter? Public Administration Review 62 (4): 471-479.
7. Brace, P. 1991. The changing context of state political economy. Journal of Politics 53 (2): 297-317.
8. Brace, P. 1993. State government and economic performance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
9. Buchanan, J. 1975. A contractarian paradigm for applying economic theory. American Economic Review 65 (2): 225-230.
10. Burge, G. 2004. A theoretical and empirical investigation of the effects of impact fees on the affordability of starter homes. PhD diss., Florida State University.
11. Burge, G., and K. Ihlanfeldt. 2006. Impact fees and multifamily housing construction. Journal of Regional Science 46 (1): 5-23.
12. Clark, T. N., and E. Goetz. 1994. The antigrowth machine: Can city governments control, limit or manage growth? In Urban innovations: Creative strategies for turbulent times, edited by T. N. Clarke, 105-145. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
13. Clingermayer, J., and R. C. Feiock. 2001. Institutional constraints and policy choice. New York: SUNY Press.
14. Connerly, C. 1988. The social implications of impact fees. Journal of the American Planning Association 54 (1): 75-78.
15. Dalenberg, D. R., and K. T. Duffy-Deno. 1991. At-large versus ward elections: Implications for public infrastructure. Public Choice 70:335-342.
16. Dixit, A. 1996. The making of economic policy: A transaction cost politics perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
17. Eisinger, P. K. 1995. State economic development in the 1990s: Politics and policy learning. Economic Development Quarterly 19 (2): 146-158.
18. Elkins, D. R., R. D. Bingham, and W. M. Bowen. 1996. Patterns in state economic development policy: Programmatically rich and programmatically lean policy patterns. State and Local Government Review 28 (3): 158-172.
19. Feiock, R. C. 1991. The effects of economic development policy on local economic growth. American Journal of Political Science 35 (3): 643-655.
20. Feiock, R. C. 2002. A quasi-market framework for local economic development competition. Journal of Urban Affairs 24:123-142.
21. Feiock, R. C. 2004a. Metropolitan governance: Conflict, competition and cooperation. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press.
22. Feiock, R. C. 2004b. Politics, institutions and local land-use regulation. Urban Studies 41 (February): 363-375.
23. Feiock, R. C., and M. Jeong. 2002. Regulatory reform and urban economic development. State and Local Government 34 (3): 153-159.
24. Feiock, R. C., M. Jeong, and J. Kim. 2003. Credible commitment and council-manager government: Implications for policy instrument choices. Public Administration Review 63 (5): 616-625.
25. Feiock, R. C., and C. Stream. 2001. Environmental protection versus economic development: A false trade-off? Public Administration Review 61 (3): 313-321.
26. Feiock, R. C., and S. Yang. 2005. Factors affecting constitutional choice: The recall provision of municipal charters. State and Local Government Review 37 (1): 40-48.
27. Fleischman, A., G. Green, and T. Kwong. 1992. What's a city to do? Explaining differences in local economic development policies. Western Political Quarterly 45 (3): 677-699.
28. Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations. 1989. A Profile of Florida municipal and county revenues. Tallahassee, FL: Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations.
29. Frank, J., and P. Downing. 1988. Patterns of impact fees use. In Development impact fee, edited by A. C. Nelson, 3-21. Washington, DC: Planners.
30. Frant, H. 1996. High-powered and low-powered incentives in the public sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 6:365-381.
31. Frederickson, G., and G. Johnson. 2001. The adapted American city: A study of institutional dynamics. Urban Affairs Review 36 (6): 872-884.
32. Goetz, S., R. Ready, and B. Stone. 1996. U.S economic growth vs. environmental conditions. Growth and Change 27 (2): 97-110.
33. Goss, E., and J. Phillips. 1997. The effect of state economic development agency spending on state income and employment growth. Economic Development Quarterly 11 (1): 88-96.
34. Greene, W. H. 2003. Econometric analysis. 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.
35. Gujarati, D. 1995. Basic econometrics. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
36. Horn, M. J. 1995. The political economy of public administration: Institutional choice in the public sector Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
37. Huffman, F., A. C. Nelson, M. Smith, and M. Stegman. 1988. Who bears the burden of development impact fees? Journal of American Planning Association 54:49-55.
38. Jeong, M. 2006. Local choices for development impact fees. Urban Affairs Review 41 (3): 338-357.
39. Johnson, L. 2004. Revolutionary local constitutional change: A theory of the consolidation process. In City county consolidation and its alternatives, edited by J. B. Carr and R. C. Feiock, 155-182. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.
40. Leight, K., and J. Jenkins. 1994. Three strategies of state economic development: Entrepreneurial, industrial recruitment, and deregulation policies in the American states. Economic Development Quarterly 8 (3): 256-269.
41. Lineberry, R. L., and E. P. Fowler. 1967. Reformism and public policies in American cities. American Political Science Review 61 (3): 701-716.
42. Logan, J., and H. Molotch. 1987. Urban fortunes: The political economy of place. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press.
43. Lubell, M., R. Feiock, and E. Ramirez. 2005. Political institutions and conservation by local governments. Urban Affairs Review 40 (6): 706-729.
44. Lyons, W. 1978. Reform and response in American cities: Structure and policy reconsidered. Social Science Quarterly 59 (1): 118-132.
45. MacManus, S. A. 1998. Financing government. In Government and politics in Florida, 2nd ed., edited by R. J. Huckshorn, 192-232. Tampa, FL: University Press of Florida.
46. Maser, S. 1998. Constitutions as relational contracts: Explaining procedural safeguards in municipal charters. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 4:527-564.
47. McCabe, B. Coyle, and R. C. Feiock. 2005. Nested levels of institutions: State rules and city property taxes. Urban Affairs Review 40 (5): 634-654.
48. Morgan, D. R., and K. Kickham. 1999. Changing the form of county government: Effects on revenue and expenditure policy. Public Administration Review 59 (4): 315-324.
49. Nelson, A., and M. Moody. 2003. Impact fees: The grease that sustains local economic development (Discussion paper). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
50. Nicholas, J. C. 1988. Calculating proportionate share impact fees. In The private finance of public services, edited by R. Alterman. New York: New York Univ. Press.
51. Nunn, S. 1990. Budgeting for public capital: Reinterpreting traditional views of urban infrastructure provision. Journal of Urban Affairs 12 (4): 327-344.
52. Ostrom, E., and V. Ostrom. 2004. The quest for meaning in public choice. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 63 (1): 105-147.
53. Rubin, I., and H. Rubin. 1987. Economic development incentives: The poor (cities) pay more. Urban Affairs Quarterly 23 (1): 37-62.
54. Schneider, M. 1992. Understanding the growth machine: The missing link between local economic development and fiscal payoffs. Journal of Politics 54 (1): 214-230.
55. Stone, C. N. 1989. Regime politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
56. Svara, J. 1993. The possibility of professionalism in county management. International Journal of Public Administration 16 (2): 2051-2080.
57. Svara, J. 1996. Leadership and professionalism in county government. In The American county: Frontiers of knowledge, edited by D. Menzel, 109-127. Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press.
58. Williamson, O. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
59. Wolman, H. 1988. Local economic development policy: What explains the divergence between policy analysis and political behavior. Journal of Urban Affairs 10 (1): 19-28.
60. Wooldridge, J. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
61. Yinger, J. 1998. The incidence of development fees and special assessments. National Tax Journal 51 (1): 23-41.