Norm, error, and the structure of rationality: The case study of the knight-knave paradigm

Semiotica

Volumn 147, Issue , 2003, Pages 265-289

  Elqayam, Shira ^a  

^a Dr Ruth Bar: Research Strategy Branding Ltd

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33646777883     PISSN: 00371998     EISSN: 16133692     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/semi.2003.095     Document Type: Article

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