The collapse illusion effect: A semantic-pragmatic illusion of truth and paradox

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 144-180

  Elqayam, Shira ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33646758840     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546780500172425     Document Type: Article

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