Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement when there are criminal teams

Economica

Volumn 71, Issue 283, 2004, Pages 333-348

  Feess, Eberhard ^a   Walzl, Markus ^b  

^a RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRIME; LAW ENFORCEMENT; PRISONER DILEMMA; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 3543124710     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00374.x     Document Type: Article

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