Efficiency and braess' Paradox under pricing in general networks

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Volumn 24, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 977-991

  Huang, Xin ^b   Ozdaglar, Asuman E ^a,b   Acemoglu, Daron ^b,c,d,e,f  

^a IEEE

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH   (Canada)

^d NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^e Econometric Society

^f European Economic Association

Author keywords

Braess' Paradox; Efficiency; Pricing; Service provider

Indexed keywords

BRAESS' PARADOX; PRICING; SERVICE PROVIDER;

COMPUTER NETWORKS; CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); DATA REDUCTION; EFFICIENCY;

DECISION THEORY;

EID: 33646435066     PISSN: 07338716     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2006.872879     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. J. G. Wardrop, "Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research," in Proc. Inst. Civil Eng., Part II, vol. 1, 1952, pp. 325-378.
2. A. Orda, R. Rom, and N. Shimkin, "Competitive routing in multi-user communication networks," IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 1, pp. 510-521, Apr. 1993.
3. F. P. Kelly, "Charging and rate control for elastic traffic," Eur: Trans. Telecommun., vol. 8, pp. 33-37, 1997.
4. F. P. Kelly, A. K. Maulloo, and D. K. Tan, "Rate control for communication networks: Shadow prices, proportional fairness, and stability," J. Oper. Res. Soc., vol. 49, pp. 237-252, 1998.
5. S. Low and D. E. Lapsley, "Optimization flow control, I: Basic algorithm and convergence," IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 861-874, 1999.
6. E. Altman, T. Basar, and R. Srikant, "Nash equilibria for combined flow control and routing in networks: Asymptoic behavior for a large number of users." IEEE Trans. Auto. Control, pp. 917-930, 2002.
7. T. Basar and R. Srikant, "Revenue-maximizing pricing and capacity expansion in a many users regime," in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2002.
8. T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, "How bad is selfish routing?," J. ACM, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 236-259, 2002.
9. S. Shenker. "Fundamental design issues for the future Internet," IEEE J. Set, Areas Commun., vol. 13, no. 7, pp. 1176-1188, 1995.
10. R. Johari and J. Tsitsiklis, "Network resource allocation and a congestion game,", Working Paper, 2003.
11. A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory. London, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.
12. R. Cole, Y. Dodis, and T. Roughgarden, "How much can taxes help selfish routing?," in Proc. ACM EC, 2003.
13. D. Acemoglu and A. E. Ozdaglar, "Flow control, routing, and performance from service provider viewport," LIDS Rep., 2004.
14. D. Mitra, K. G. Ramakrishnan, and Q. Wang, "Combined economic modeling and traffic engineering: Joint optimization of pricing and routing in multi-service networks," in Proc. 17th Int. Teletraffic Congr., Salvador, Brazil, 2001, pp. 73-85.
15. L. He and J. Walrand, "Pricing Internet services with multiple providers," in Proc. Allerton Conf., 2003.
16. D. Braess, Uber ein paradoxen der verkehrsplanung, in Unternehmensforschung, vol. 12, pp. 258-268, 1968.
17. E. Altman, T. Basar, T. Jiménez, and N. Shimkin, "Competitive routing in networks with polynomial cost," IEEE Trans. Auto. Control, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 92-96, Jan. 2002.
18. A. Haurie and P. Marcotte, "On the relationship between Nash-Cournot and Wardrop equilibria," Networks, vol. 15, pp. 295-308, 1985.
19. M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, and C. B. Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1956.
20. M. Patriksson, "The traffic assignment problem: models and methods," Topics in Transportation, 1994. Koninklijke Wohrmann BV.
21. S. Dafermos and A. Nagurney, "Sensitivity analysis for the asymmetric network equilibrium problem," Math. Program., vol. 28, pp. 174-184, 1983.
22. T. Roughgarden, "On the severity of Braess's Paradox: Designing networks for selfish users is hard," in Proc. 42nd Annu. IEEE Symp. Found. Comput. Sci., Oct. 2001.
23. J. E. Cohen and F. P. Kelly, "A paradox of congestion in a queuing network," J. Appl. Probability, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 730-734, 1990.
24. J. Hagstrom, "Characterizing Braess's Paradox for traffic networks," in Proc. IEEE 2001 Conf. Intell. Transp. Syst., 2001, pp. 837-842.
25. Y. A. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda, "Avoiding the Braess Paradox in noncooperative networks." J. Appl. Probability, pp. 211-222, Mar. 1999.
26. E. Altman, R. E. Azouzi, and O. Pourtallier, "Avoiding paradoxes in routing games," in Proc. 17th Int. Teletraffic Conf., 2001.
27. S. Dafermos and A. Nagurney, "On some traffic equilibrium theory paradoxes," Transp. Res., vol. 18B, pp. 101-110, 1984.
28. R. Steinberg and W. I. Zangwill, "The prevalence of Braess' Paradox," Transp. Sci., vol. 17, pp. 301-318, 1983.
29. M. A. Hall, "Properties of the equilibrium state in transportation networks," Transp. Sci., vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 208-216, 1978.
30. E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou, "Worse-case equilibria," in Proc. 16th Annu. Symp. Theoretical Aspects of Comput. Sci., 1999, pp. 404-413.
31. A. Czumaj and B. Vöcking, "Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria," in Proc. 13th Annu. Symp. Discrete Algorithms, 2002, pp. 413-120.
32. H. Yaïche, R. R. Mazumdar, and C. Rosenberg, "A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in boardband networks," in IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 8, 2000, pp. 667-678.
33. E. Altman, T. Basar, T. Jiménez, and N. Shimkin, A Survey on Networking Games in Telecommunications, 2000.
34. A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare. New York: Macmillan, 1920.
35. L. Qiu, Y. R. Yang, Y. Zhang, and S. Shenker, "On selfish routing in Internet-like environments," in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, 2003, pp. 151-162.
36. D. Bertsekas and R. Gallager, Data Networks, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992.
37. Y. A. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda, "Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies," IEEE Trans. Netw., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 161-173, 1997.
38. S. Sanghavi and B. Hajek, "Optimal allocation of a divisible good to strategic buyers," in Proc. 43rd IEEE Conf. Decision and Control, 2004, pp. 2748-2753.
39. E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, and T. Roughgarden, "The price of stability for network design with selfish agents," in Proc. IEEE Symp. Foundations of Comput. Sci., 2004, pp. 295-304.