Transaction costs and the robustness of the coase theorem

Economic Journal

Volumn 116, Issue 508, 2006, Pages 223-245

  Anderlini, Luca ^a   Felli, Leonardo ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NEGOTIATION PROCESS; TRADE AGREEMENT; TRANSACTION COST;

EID: 33645930966     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01054.x     Document Type: Article

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